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During his second term, George W. Bush pushed comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), a 
policy that addressed illegal immigration through several provisions at once.  Some of those 
provisions were favored by conservative border security hawks, including augmenting Border 
Patrol efforts with technology and increased manpower, while others were favored by pro-
immigration liberals, including a temporary worker program and a clear path to citizenship.  To 
pass both at the same time was clearly a challenge, but President Bush was the perfect man for 
the job, due to his security credentials and his left-leaning immigration stance.  Bush seized what 
he thought was the perfect moment to capitalize on broad public support for the general outline 
of CIR.  For nearly two years, his push for CIR ran into problems, including two counter-
movements, a sweeping change of the makeup of Congress, and xenophobic hysteria stirred up 
by the right wing.  Bush’s prolonged failure to garner public support for CIR became the 
defining domestic failure of his second term.  To date, no explanation of his failure on CIR 
accounts for his rhetoric, an oversight that deprives the historical record of understanding 
presidential leadership.  This dissertation combines social movement theory and a generally 
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Chapter One: The Rhetorical Situation 
In late 2005, George W. Bush introduced a policy initiative addressing a variety of 
problems in immigration policy.  Generally referred to as comprehensive immigration reform 
(CIR), Bush’s approach avoided piecemeal legislation that would increase border security or 
create a one-time amnesty provision, like the policies favored by his predecessors. CIR included 
a provision to create a clear path to citizenship for those already living in the United States, 
another provision creating temporary worker programs for those who would enter in the future, 
and a third provision to increase Border Patrol funding to stem the tide of illegal immigrants 
from Mexico, along with various other measures.  While the specific policies around those 
provisions changed from bill-to-bill, including the length of border fencing, the end of catch-and-
release policies, and other small differences, the three general tenets remained consistent. The 
idea first gained steam under the Clinton administration while being championed by Barbara 
Jordan (Sailer, 2013, para. 6), who argued that negotiating a variety of interrelated concerns at 
once would create better policy than passing a series of bills negotiated separately.  Bush wanted 
to make wholesale changes to the way the United States government legislated immigration 
(Stengle & Thomas, 2013, para. 6) and to do so he introduced a far-reaching policy based around 
compromise. 
Democrats were initially suspicious of Bush on immigration.  Then-Senate minority 
leader Harry Reid said that Bush had as little credibility on immigration as he had on national 
security or Iraq (Senate Democrats, 2006, para. 2), a sentiment Illinois Senator Richard Durbin 
echoed, suggesting Bush’s immigration efforts disguised an unrealized sinister motive involving 
Iraq (“Democrats’ Immigration Response,” 2006, para. 16). However, they eventually realized 
that Bush might be the only president who could deliver sweeping reforms, because he supported 
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the Democrat-friendly provisions of CIR on idealistic grounds and had the credibility with the 
right to ensure conservative votes on the issue.  
By May of 2006, the Senate version of an immigration bill had garnered strong support 
from the left, converting Democrat stalwarts Harry Reid, Ted Kennedy, and others.  Republican 
strategists also came onboard, including Karl Rove, who encouraged Republicans to increase 
their outreach to Latinos as part of his plan to create a “durable Republican majority” (Egan, 
2012, para. 3), a broad coalition whose electoral might would be unassailable (Miranda, 2006). 
As Bush began a months-long campaign to push his policy, it appeared he had bipartisan 
support, something he’d lacked in previous campaigns to revise Social Security and gain support 
for a same-sex marriage ban (Bush, 2010, p. 306; Medhurst, 2008).  
For a time, it appeared that the stars had aligned for Bush on CIR.  Both political parties 
agreed that immigration was a considerable problem that needed attention, Bush had the 
credibility and trust from both sides of the aisle to empower him to make change, and as he went 
public with his appeals, he knew he could count on key voting blocs for support, particularly 
growing Latino communities in the key battleground states of Florida, Colorado, and Arizona 
which would be appealing to Republicans interested in the party’s longevity (Edsall and 
Goldfarb 2006).  Unlike Social Security reforms that collapsed over the summer, Bush shared 
policy ground with his Democratic opponents, suggesting his opposition would be minimal 
(Galston 2007).  The path looked clear. 
Optimism was short-lived.  Bush’s support on the right, a group on whom he could 
traditionally rely, fell through.  Key conservative constituencies insisted that Bush scrap CIR in 
favor of Republican-friendly security measures and Congressional Republicans opted to pass an 
incredibly punitive bill that focused solely on border security without addressing a temporary 
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worker program or a path to citizenship (Currie, 2006; Dukakis and Mitchell, 2006) instead of 
the omnibus bill that would address a variety of concerns simultaneously (Serwer, 2013, para. 1).  
The Senate version never passed into conference committee (Senate Democrats, 2006, para. 1) 
and Bush’s immigration reforms died.   
The failure was one of President Bush’s biggest disappointments in office, personally and 
politically. If offered one “do-over” from his presidency, it would be CIR, he told Cal Thomas of 
The Washington Times in 2009, because “a system that is so broken that humans become 
contraband is a system that really needs to be re-examined” (2009, Question 28, para. 3) and the 
continued dehumanization of immigrants upset him on a personal level.  Building on Bush’s 
emotional attachment to the issue, Mickey Kaus (2007) called CIR the “domestic Iraq” (para.1) 
noting the similarities between the two issues representing equally idealistic approaches that 
sought, “in one fell swoop, to achieve a grand solution to a persistent, difficult problem” (para. 5) 
that had foiled Bush’s presidential predecessors.   
Also like Iraq, Bush faced considerable political backlash when he failed to deliver 
results that lived up to expectations.  Republicans did not share his personal connection to 
immigration and Bush’s failure cost him considerable support among his base. Byron York 
(2007) explained that conservative Washington insiders were “unhappy because the president 
allied himself with Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,” never beloved of conservative Republicans, to 
craft “an immigration deal that leaned too far toward amnesty for illegal immigrants” (para. 3).  
When momentum for the bill stalled, conservative talk radio stirred up considerable 
public opposition to the bill, which they labeled amnesty.  Consequently, conservative 
lawmakers felt the need to pander to their base with a far more partisan bill in time for the 2006 
midterm elections, prompting an editorial in The New York Times to mockingly suggest the 
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Republicans’ idea of omnibus legislation would be a bill to outlaw  “illegal gay liberal Mexican 
flag burners” (Immigration Road Show, 2006, para. 7).   
Bush has been clear and outspoken regarding the blame for the failure of the bill, in 
interviews, in his memoir, and in public addresses since he left office.  He did not blame his 
immigration loss on the rapid erosion of popular support during 2006 or the sudden 
disappearance of his Republican allies. He also avoided taking the blame himself, in spite of 
focusing his domestic agenda on the issue for over a year with few results.  From his perspective, 
pushing Social Security directly before CIR was the key strategic mistake that was chiefly, if not 
solely, responsible for his failure to pass the immigration reform bill he championed.  Bush 
explained that he, “should have pushed immigration reform right after the ´04 election and not 
Social Security reform” (Question 28, para. 2) because Social Security reform was the infamous 
“third rail” of American politics and Congress was unwilling to act “until the crisis [was] upon 
us” (Question 28, para. 2).  In Decision Points (2010), he echoed this sentiment by extolling the 
virtues of CIR, which unlike Social Security reform, “had bipartisan support.  The wildfire of 
opposition that erupted against immigration reform in 2006 and 2007 might not have raged as 
hot in 2005…When Social Security failed, it widened the partisan divide and made immigration 
tougher” (p. 306), exacerbating a partisan political environment in which any subsequent agenda 
items were non-starters on Capitol Hill.  In Bush’s alternate history, changing the order in which 
he pushed his reforms, while changing nothing else about his actions, would have prevented 
Congressional intransigence and ideological in-fighting, which in turn would have salvaged his 
second term and preserved his domestic legacy.   
  To scholars of presidential rhetoric, Bush’s explanation rings hollow.  If presidential 
leadership cannot ferry a popular proposal with broad support through the process of becoming 
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law because of a matter as trivial as scheduling, then presidential leadership has little actual 
function in our democracy and is hardly worth the media attention and scrutiny it receives. To 
suggest that the partisan divide was an insurmountable obstacle directly contradicts Bush’s 
contention that the bill originally enjoyed widespread bipartisan support. His explanation also 
fails to explain why it was his party that abandoned the proposal or how talk radio so 
successfully exploited that partisan divide.  Bush’s narrative paints the presidency as incapable 
of shaping public support and further ignores his opposition’s rhetorical efforts.  However, the 
failure of immigration reform cannot be explained by a resigned glance at the calendar.  The 
rhetorical dimension of Bush’s failure is best explained through the process of analyzing Bush’s 
rhetoric in the context of the rhetorical situation he faced. 
The stark disparity between the state of immigration reform at its 2005 outset and its 
2007 conclusion highlights the rhetorical dimensions of Bush’s failure in general terms.  CIR 
started with bipartisan support, but left behind a massive partisan divide.  The bill came along in 
a time of clear need, but Bush’s campaign failed to generate a groundswell of public support 
around that need.  Passing the reforms was crucial to the Republican party’s political future, but 
the campaign failed to convince conservative lawmakers to take unified action in their collective 
self-interest.   
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that American attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration change when they pay attention to the issue, making this subject one of the most 
likely areas on which presidential rhetoric can foster widespread change in opinion. Christopher 
Muste (2013) found that survey respondents’ feelings about immigration changed as a result of 
survey questions drawing their attention to the issue. Branton and Dunaway (2009a; 2009b) 
found the increased attention border communities pay to immigration has a substantial impact on 
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the valence and salience of attitudes of those living in such communities.  Finally, much of the 
work on media and presidential framing, which will be explained in detail in chapter two, has 
found a positive effect on attitudes that arises from audience attention, absent any other factors.  
Simply by spending time giving speeches on immigration, research strongly suggests Bush 
should have had a positive and measurable effect on audience opinion.  
The amount of presidential time and capital wasted on immigration reform brings to mind 
Bitzer’s (1968) warning that a rhetorical situation “does not invite just any response…it invites a 
fitting response” (p.10, emphasis original). At first glance, it seems that Bush’s response fit his 
situation poorly, given the advantages he enjoyed at the outset of his push and his eventual 
failure.  After a year of presidential attention on immigration reform, the fact that Bush failed to 
find a fitting response is startling. 
To better understand the rhetorical situation which called Bush’s rhetoric into being, the 
next section follows Bitzer’s (1968) call to outline “the nature of those contexts in which 
speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse” (p.1), because “rhetorical works belong to the 
class of things which obtain their character from the circumstances of the historical context in 
which they occur” (p. 3).  The section is comprised of three sub-sections, each of which is part of 
the rhetorical situation.  The first sub-section explains how illegal immigration became 
increasingly urgent for voters and therefore for elected officials.  The second section looks at the 
unique attributes George W. Bush possessed that inspired key stakeholders to believe he could 
achieve change on the issue.  The final subsection looks at the audiences Bush faced who could 
not only be influenced by Bush’s appeals, but were potential “mediators for change” (p. 8), 
specifically focusing on Congressional Republicans, whose votes on the bill were crucial to its 
7 
 
passage, the American voters who could pressure lawmakers into passage of the bill, and Latinos 
who could, and eventually did, make their voice heard through organized demonstration.  
Outlining the elements of the rhetorical situation at the outset of Bush’s push helps 
explain the general contextual elements that gave rise to Bush’s rhetoric, but even a general 
outline involves “presence,” imbuing certain events and rhetorical efforts with meaning simply 
through selecting them as worthy of analysis.  Richard Vatz (1973) used Chaim Perelman’s 
argumentation theory to explain how the choice of texts by the critic is not neutral or valueless, 
but rather “an act of creativity.  It is an interpretive act” (p.157).  Therefore, in the final section 
of this chapter I explain which critical methods I use to analyze the failure of CIR and which 
texts were selected to represent each stage of Bush’s rhetoric. I also preview the analysis to 
come.   
Context 
Immigration reform was a difficult proposition towards the end of the twentieth century.  
Piecemeal amnesty bills passed under Reagan and Clinton legalized the citizenship of 
approximately 5.6 million new Americans (NPR Staff, 2010; Swarns, 2006; Weiner, 2013), 
while funding for Border Patrol increased substantially throughout the same time period in an 
attempt to prevent illegals crossing into the United States (Gomez, 2013).  Most notably, the 
1986 Simpson-Mazzoli act, often referred to by journalists and lawmakers as “the Reagan 
amnesty” (Pear, 2007; “A Reagan Legacy,” 2010; Plumer, 2013; Gentilviso, 2013) granted an 
amnesty to around 3 million immigrants living in the United States illegally.  However, large-
scale legislation addressing contradictions and difficulties in immigration policy did not come to 
fruition, partly due to the “ambivalent, contradictory, and sometimes hostile” (Ewing, 2012, p. 1) 
nature of U.S. citizens’ attitudes about immigration (Muste, 2013; Pew, 2006), and partly due to 
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government’s inability to address these multifaceted concerns.  Unfortunately, many of the 
provisions in the Reagan amnesty were set to expire by the end of 2006, leaving future of border 
security and immigration policy very much in doubt. 
On one hand, voters have never been particularly sympathetic to immigrants. Whether 
discussing African, Asian, or even Western European immigrants historically, the degree to 
which Americans were willing to accept newcomers was often derived from material concerns, 
rather than higher-minded ideals (Ewing, 2012).  Americans have seen immigration as a matter 
of entitlement, favoring those who already have citizenship unless the country needed a cheap 
labor force.  Native-born Americans, themselves the descendants of immigrants, “have often 
taken a dim view of the growing numbers of Latin American, Asian, and African immigrants 
who began to arrive in the second half of the 20th century” (Ewing, 2012).   
By the Clinton administration, twice as many Americans wanted the level of immigration 
reduced as thirty years before, with nearly two out of every three Americans supporting 
immigration reduction (Muste, 2013, table 3).  Clinton turned to the Jordan commission, which 
spent much of the 1990’s isolating the best objectives in CIR.  In 1994, U.S. Immigration Policy:  
Restoring Credibility recommended stronger enforcement at the border and workplaces in order 
to curb illegal immigration, bemoaning “Serious problems [that] undermine present immigration 
policies, their implementation, and their credibility” (Recommendations, para. 1). The 
combination of bureaucratic incompetence and lax border enforcement created a perverse 
incentive system in which legal immigration was too difficult and illegal immigration was too 
easy.   
The following year, the Jordan commission published Legal Immigration:  Setting 
Priorities, which laid out clear legislative objectives to address these concerns.  Rather than 
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attempting to increase or decrease the number of immigrants granted citizenship status on an ad 
hoc basis or blindly throwing resources at border security until the flow of immigrants ceased, 
the commission suggested a comprehensive approach to address many concerns at once. The 
idea that successful immigration legislation required a multi-pronged effort that included 
measures that would be controversial to both Republicans and Democrats made the goal clear, 
but it also made the politics of passing such a bill difficult at best. 
By the early 2000s, problems with immigration policy had reached a boiling point.  
While the portion of Americans who wanted to decrease immigration had doubled in the three 
decades leading up to 1995, the following decade reversed that trend.  In the years between the 
Jordan Commission and the beginning of Bush’s push for immigration reform, the portion of 
Americans who wanted to increase the level of immigration doubled (Muste, 2013, chart 1).  
Even more baffling, at the same time that more Americans wanted more immigration, the portion 
that sought reductions remained unchanged (Muste, 2013, table 1).  By the time Bush addressed 
CIR, his audience wanted immigration to increase and decrease, both at twice the rate of the 
previous generation. Americans were increasingly divided about what to do, but also 
increasingly unified that something needed to be done.  By 2005, only one in five Americans 
thought the government was “doing enough with respect to illegal immigration” (Table 16) and 
less than half of those who did think the government was doing enough supported the 
government’s actions strongly (Table 16).    
Much of the increased polarization on immigration can be accounted for by the difficulty 
Americans had in identifying the problem to which the government should respond.  As 
Americans agreed that there was an immigration problem, they disagreed on the nature of the 
problem in significant ways. The left contended that immigration was “a humanitarian crisis in 
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our borderlands” (Holub, 2010).  Moderates believed the economic problem trumped 
humanitarian concerns, as highlighted by David Brooks, who lamented, “The forlorn pundit 
doesn’t even have to make the humanitarian case that immigration reform would be a great 
victory for human dignity. The cold economic case by itself is so strong” (2013, para. 2).  And at 
the same time, the right could not reckon with economic factors while under the shadow of a 
security threat, arguing “the real problem presented by illegal immigration is security, not the 
supposed threat to the economy” (Kane & Johnson, 2006, para. 6). Clearly a large-scale, 
comprehensive package was called for to remedy the many outstanding issues regarding border 
security and living conditions for illegal immigrants.  Unfortunately, the variety of those 
demands made it difficult to craft a satisfactory policy.  
By 2006, however, a tenuous political consensus had formed around the legislation Bush 
proposed, with a path to citizenship to please those with humanitarian concerns, interior 
enforcement mechanisms for those with economic concerns, and a wide variety of proposals for 
those with security concerns. Republican strategists recognized the political potential of 
appealing to a growing Latino voting bloc on a political level, while valuing border security on 
an ideological one as well.  Democrats were willing to deal with a President who had strong 
credibility on immigration, because they wanted many of the provisions in the bill as well and 
were unlikely to be offered a friendlier bill by any other Republican. 
George W. Bush 
 At first blush, it might not appear that George W. Bush was the appropriate leader to 
take up the mantle of CIR, an idea whose strength was tied to bipartisanship and compromise.  
As Keith Hennessey noted, “the tenure of President George W. Bush was dominated by 
partisanship. There were deep partisan splits over the war in Iraq, enhanced interrogation, 
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wiretapping, the 2003 tax cuts, and Social Security reform” (2010, para. 1).  Gary Jacobson 
(2007) made the case that Bush pursued partisanship as a political strategy, preferring conflict 
over compromise, a view summarized in Ron Suskind’s (2004) portrait of an uncompromising 
Bush who relied on his faith in order to demonize his opposition (para. 12). Gregg Easterbrook 
explained the partisan divide Bush pursued was existential and spiritual, between “people who 
believe in something larger than themselves, and people who believe that it’s all an accident of 
chemistry” (Keller 2003, para. 10).  The conventional wisdom is that Bush presided over an 
ideologically divided America, strengthened that divide at every opportunity, and used his faith 
to stymie rational debate, all of which made political compromise during the Bush presidency 
grudging, cautious, and rare.   
A slightly deeper look reveals that Bush was not only the right man for the job, but 
perhaps the only one with the credibility on immigration necessary to ensure compromise.  He 
had Democratic support on the issue (Schumer, 2006), Latinos gave him a 68% job approval 
rating early in his presidency (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2002, para. 4) and success on the issue was 
crucial to Republicans interested in borrowing some of Bush’s credibility to wooing Latino 
voters. 
The roots of Bush’s credibility on immigration were based in his long history with the 
issue, having served as Governor of Texas, during which time he “expressed sympathy with 
Mexican immigrants” (Visa Law, 1999, para. 1) and regularly gave interviews in Spanish for 
Spanish-language media outlets.  As Bush campaigned in 2000, he attacked inefficiencies at INS 
(Eisner, 2000, para. 3) and told the La Raza annual conference that he “wanted immigrants to the 
United States to be welcomed with open arms” (Gonzales, 2000).  Bush became the second 
president, after Gerald Ford, to speak at naturalization ceremonies, showing that “immigrants 
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need not be feared, but greeted with ‘openness and courtesy’ because the very act of their 
immigration and eventual naturalization was about breathing and living the ‘American 





In the spring of 2006, a majority of Americans wanted to provide some sort of amnesty 
for those already living in the U.S. but they also saw illegal immigration as “a serious problem” 
(“State of American public opinion,” 2006), suggesting that a policy that augmented border 
security while providing a path to citizenship would be popular.  The perceived urgency of the 
problem suggested that achieving some sort of omnibus bill would be a political victory for 
Bush, his supporters, and those in favor of most immigration reforms.  Bush had an opportunity 
to win over swing voters as well, because a majority of Americans disapproved of how Bush had 
handled immigration up to that point, and generally expressed “greater confidence in Democrats 
on immigration issues than Republicans” (“State of American public opinion,” 2006), a trend 
that suggested a centrist approach could be very successful for Bush’s political future.   
In addition to the benefits of meeting American voters in the center, Republicans realized 
it was in their self-interest to woo the Latino voting base. Increasingly, swing voters were turning 
from the GOP, largely because the Latino population grew more quickly than the primarily 
Anglo Republican base (Roperreports, 2004, results).  Florida was a particularly notable swing 
state in both of Bush’s Presidential campaigns, with 380,000 voters representing the margin of 
victory for Bush in 2004 (Washington Post, 2004, results), meaning the 2004 Presidential 
election was effectively determined by around one-tenth of one percent of American citizens 
(Census.gov), making even slight demographic changes in the voting base crucial to both sides. 
Since 2004, Latino voting populations had been growing in size and their composition was 
increasingly liberal.  The ideological shift among the overall Latino voting bloc was clearest in 
Florida, as traditionally conservative Cubans represented a shrinking proportion of the voting 
population and more liberal voters of Mexican and Central American descent surged there 
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(Goodnough, 2004). Among Latinos nationwide, Bush’s nine point defeat in 2000 might seem 
like a poor showing, but no Republican presidential candidate has received as much Latino 
support in a Presidential election before or since (Roperreports, 2012; CNN Polling, 2012; 
Bloomberg Businessweek, 2012).  While Karl Rove rarely spoke about immigration in 2006, 
since Bush left office he has been a regular on Fox News extolling the importance of the Latino 
vote to the future of the Republican Party.  Immigration, he argued “keeps Latinos who 
otherwise agree with us from hearing us,” (Roberts, 2014, para. 15).  
Neither the general support CIR enjoyed among the American people nor Bush’s 
popularity among Latinos was reflected in the voters’ overall attitudes towards Bush, as many 
voters were beginning to turn away from the President. In May of 2006, George W. Bush’s 
approval rating was at a dismal 31% (Gallup, 2013).  Among the most surprising numbers were 
his approval ratings among conservatives, which had dipped to 52%, while his support among 
moderates was a putrid 28% (Page, 2006), largely due to his administration’s failures on 
Hurricane Katrina and Iraq (Lipton, 2006). The American people were increasingly critical of the 
Bush administration’s “abdication of the most solemn obligation to provide for the common 
welfare” (Lipton, 2006, para. 7) of Americans, and the August 2005 flooding of New Orleans, 
combined with a command-and-control infrastructure that seemed confused and disinterested 
served to galvanize popular opinion against the administration. From April 2005 to April 2006 
Bush’s support had plummeted from half of America to half of conservatives (CNN, 2006).   
Analysis and Text Selections 
The critical method I use in this study draws from two bodies of research.  The first is 
social movement criticism, which started with Leland Griffin, who looked to the study of 
collective action as an alternative to neo-classical criticism’s focus on great orators. By studying 
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a “multiplicity of speakers, speeches, audiences, and occasions” (1952, 184), Griffin hoped to 
outline a theory that could guide future research.  Unfortunately, no unified theory of social 
movements exists. Scholars have been unable to develop a consensus on what objects are worthy 
of study, how social movements differ from other forms of collective action, and most difficult 
for this study, no unified method of analysis (Burgchardt, 2010).   
David Zarefsky (1980) expressed skepticism that social movements are clearly defined 
objects with objectively definable goals that remain constant among movements.  Drawing from 
Zarefsky’s work, I argue that movements should be understood as a form of collective action that 
draws its defining elements from the historical context in which they exist.  Therefore, Griffin’s 
social movement outline is used as a metaphor to organize and illuminate how Bush’s rhetoric 
progressed over time, from inception, to crisis, to consummation, and how at each stage his 
rhetoric evolved to meet specific goals arising from his audience and the rhetorical situation. 
Zarefsky’s (1980) skeptical view of movement theory requires the second approach that 
informs the critical method in this paper, an inductive, audience-centered view of the rhetorical 
situation and the rhetoric Bush employed in response. This study starts from a broad analysis of 
key texts that will reveal strategies to be considered in reference to audience data.  It is important 
to bring in this second method, because while the rhetoric of social movements progresses and 
changes over time, it also consists of individual texts created within a particular historical 
moment and performed for an audience within that particular moment.  
These two approaches can be viewed as complementary.  The inductive approach will 
identify patterns that can then be integrated within the focus on Bush’s rhetoric as a form of a 
social movement, proceeding in three acts from inception to crisis to consummation. The overall 
method in this study requires the two approaches to complement each other in order to explain 
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whether or not each text resonated with an audience, measuring resonance with historical 
context, audience data, and relevant theory.  The inductive approach explains how each text is 
constructed and delivered to an audience within a specific historical context, while the general 
organization of a social movement shows how those texts change over time, in response to an 
evolving rhetorical situation and constraints arising from Bush’s previous rhetoric. 
Once Bush’s push for CIR is divided into broad stages, the second step is to consider the 
ingredients of the rhetoric in relation to the rhetorical situation Bush faced, in order to develop “a 
sense of what goes with what” (Burke, 1984, p.74). The key tool used to identify the relevant 
ingredients in each text is a descriptive analysis, similar to the models outlined in Campbell et 
al.’s (2013) The Rhetorical Act: Thinking, speaking, and writing critically and Rowland’s (2010) 
Analyzing Rhetoric: A handbook for the informed citizen in a new millennium. 
Descriptive analysis is a tool to focus a critic’s attention “on how [rhetorical acts] are 
intended to work in order to influence audiences” (Campbell et al., p. 52).  This open-ended 
method is based in a number of broad categories, including purpose, audience, persona, tone, 
evidence, structure, and strategies, and it is flexible enough to accommodate other categories as 
they present themselves.  While descriptive analysis does not itself prescribe specific theory, the 
method “offers a vocabulary for discussing rhetorical action and a method to identify what is 
distinctive about a particular persuasive effort” (p. 28) allowing the critic to make a judgment.  
Once the elements of the rhetorical situation have been identified, including historical 
context, rhetorical barriers, and the specific ingredients of the rhetorical act, the final step 
requires the identification of larger strategic patterns within Bush’s rhetoric, within each stage 
and across stages over time. Strategic patterns discovered through descriptive analysis are 
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intimately tied to the rhetorical situation, because they highlight the selections made by a speaker 
to influence an audience within a historical context.   
Contributions to Social Movement Theory 
Herbert W. Simons (1970) provided an example of the ideological blind spots that can 
afflict a critic who begins with theory rather than with the rhetorical situation.  Simons developed 
a structural definition of movements based on sociological research, which he used to enumerate 
“rhetorical requirements” for leaders.  In doing so, he argued that movements cannot be 
institutional and must interact with a larger structure.  At first glance, it might seem that the 
leader of the free world would work within a clearly defined and highly organized institution, 
and that a president could never face a “larger structure” than the United States federal 
government, preventing Bush’s efforts from meeting the definitional requirements of a social 
movement.  However, Bush looked to promote CIR “by appealing directly to the American 
public…forcing compliance from fellow Washingtonians by going over their heads” (Kernell, 
2007, 2), a strategy known as going public, which eschews the institutional and material 
advantages the government usually provides to the president, and asks the American public to 
interact with the larger structure of Congress, meeting all of the rhetorical requirements of a 
social movement. 
Another example of the blind spots caused by theory comes from Robert S. Cathcart 
(1972, 1978), who believed that movements have to act outside the system, in order for an 
agonistic dialectic to be formed between those in favor of the status quo and those in favor of 
reform.  For politically-minded social movements, the system to which Cathcart refers is the 
government, and no individual could be more inside that system than the president.  Once again, 
the strategy of going public shows how Bush made a deliberate choice to act outside the 
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traditional power system, and in doing so, operated within Cathcart’s vision, except that he did 
so from the Oval Office.  Martin Medhurst (1996) summarized the findings of many authors 
including Jeffrey Tulis and Glen Thurow, concluding that public-facing strategies the president 
may employ represent a massive shift in power within the political system, radically altering the 
rules that govern the system itself.  Campbell and Jamieson (2008) begin from a similar premise, 
assuming that many presidential genres serve to take power from the legislative branch, which is 
supported by Samuel Kernell’s (2006) work on going public.  All of this research supports the 
idea that going public, the most common rhetorical strategy employed by presidents, is 
analogous to the power relationship between speaker and audience within social movement 
rhetoric. 
While Bush’s dialectic with his initial audience might not have been agonistic, his 
dialectic with the second audience, Congressional Republicans, certainly was.  By going directly 
to voters, Bush hoped to persuade audience members to pressure Congress, which would force 
Congress to choose between passing his version of the bill and facing unemployment.   
Zarefsky’s case against Simons and Cathcart employed counter-examples to refute the 
definitions on which their work was built.  He argued that Simons’ case studies were 
generalizations rather than principled distinctions and drew from examples of presidential 
leadership to demonstrate that Simons’ definition of movements was neither comprehensive nor 
unique to movements.  His response to Cathcart drew from recent examples within the Carter 
administration and Zarefsky’s (1977) own work with Lyndon Johnson to demonstrate that 
institutional reform efforts could be studied the same way as progressive social movements.  In 
particular, he argued that dialectical enjoinment between rhetor and opposition is one of the 
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primary rhetorical acts within movement studies, whether or not those parties exist within 
institutions.   
Thus, one reasonable approach to studying Bush’s efforts to achieve CIR is by treating 
them as analogous to a social movement.  Consequently, I will use the inductive method to 
explain the evolution of Bush’s rhetoric from the period in which his efforts began through its 
ultimate failure, which I will describe using Griffin’s terms of inception, crisis, and 
consummation.  The two will work together to highlight the progression of Bush’s rhetorical 
strategy within an evolving rhetorical situation. 
Contributions to Presidential Campaign Research 
Presidential campaign rhetoric is a topic that has been heavily researched (Simons, 
Chesebro, and Orr, 1973; Rarick et al., 1977; Hart, 2009; Smith 2010), but research that ties 
strategic choices to the rhetorical situation highlights two key areas that this study should 
address.  The first area of rhetorical scholarship to which I contribute looks at the relationship 
between a speaker’s overall body of work and the particular needs of a specific social movement.  
Harpine (2001) explained that the strategy of working within a movement can curtail future 
rhetorical choices by a speaker, while Goodnight (1986) shows the converse, how a speaker’s 
past rhetoric can constrain the choices afforded when using a movement strategy.   
Harpine’s (2001) work is especially applicable to immigration reform, because it focuses 
on polarization and the two-audience problem of social movements, in which a speaker needs to 
seem radical enough to motivate supporters while remaining moderate enough to avoid 
alienating the mainstream public.  While Harpine discussed William Jennings Bryan, the 
example is illustrative of a pitfall facing Bush:  it would be difficult to motivate his base without 
losing the Democrats who came across the aisle to help him, and vice versa. 
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Leadership is the second area in which this study can be helpful for uniting presidential 
campaign rhetoric and social movement theory. Bush’s efforts on immigration were dependent 
on his leadership, which is granted through the authority of presidential rhetoric (Murphy, 2008), 
because audiences “rightly equate leadership with eloquence” (Condit, 2010). Stewart et al. 
(2007) show that leadership requires the ability to bring people together, arguing “Leaders must 
have organizational skills, particularly the ability to attract individuals to the idea of collective 
action and to draw people together into meaningful relationships and organizations” (p. 115).  In 
order to pass immigration reform, Bush needed to show the kind of leadership that could bring 
people together, in order to support an omnibus deal requiring all sides to compromise. Thus, a 
study of his efforts on behalf of CIR has the potential to inform our understanding of presidential 
leadership. 
Chapter Preview 
The second chapter will review relevant literature regarding George W. Bush and 
immigration reform. It will focus on news coverage of Bush’s push for immigration reform first, 
to explain how the overall arc of his rhetoric was seen at the time.  Next the chapter will look at 
the academic study of Bush’s rhetoric in general and on immigration reform specifically.  The 
following section begins by looking at research that discusses media framing, by far the largest 
body of academic literature on illegal immigration.  Next, the chapter summarizes research on 
the rhetorical power of the presidency on issues relevant to immigration reform.  The review of 
relevant literature in chapter two situates this study within a larger picture of Bush as a partisan 
ideologue who was talking to an ideologically charged audience within a complicated context 
about illegal immigration.   
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The subsequent three chapters tell the story of CIR in three parts, from inception to crisis 
to consummation. In the first section of each chapter I outline the historical context of the stage, 
including important events, audience data, and other background information about the rhetoric.  
Next, I isolate key ingredients from the rhetorical situation, including rhetorical barriers and 
purposes.  In the subsequent section of each chapter, I sketch the strategic patterns found in 
Bush’s rhetoric.  Finally, I explain how the strategic patterns functioned against the barriers 
isolated in the earlier sections. Each chapter will focus on whether the rhetoric resonated for the 
situated audience, and if the rhetoric contributed to the overall efforts to achieve CIR. 
Chapter three covers the inception stage, which began in November 2005, with Bush’s 
“The Future of Immigration Policy” speech in Tucson, Arizona, and continued until the end of 
the year.  The speech was the first Bush delivered which focused exclusively on immigration 
reform during his push, and themes from other rhetoric in the inception stage trace back to 
Tucson.  Griffin (1960, p. 460) noted that a movement begins when people “rise up and cry No 
to the existing order” (emphasis original), which often requires developing a consensus about the 
state of the social order, and what it means to say “no.”  In the Tucson address, Bush stressed 
themes of insecurity and criminality among immigrants, and placed the blame for government 
inaction squarely on Congress, subtly weaving definitional strategies together to create 
associations between himself and the Border Patrol.  
Chapter four discusses the crisis stage of immigration reform, which commenced in early 
2006 with the emergence of two powerful counter-movements representing the extremes of both 
sides of the immigration debates.  Even as pro-immigration protestors took to the streets in 
massive “Dia Sin Imigrantes” demonstrations, conservatives organized Congress-facing appeals 
including mailing bricks to Capitol Hill and occupying the Senate phone lines for weeks at a 
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time.  Bush’s rhetoric during crisis stage is best represented by two speeches.  The first is his 
April 2006 “Immigration Reform” address in Irvine, California, which he delivered while the 
Senate was reviewing a CIR bill in committee. After the Irvine address, the Democratic-
controlled Senate moved to floor debate on the bill, and Bush addressed the nation from the Oval 
Office, a historic and unprecedented milestone for immigration reform.  As he delivered the Oval 
Office address, he hoped to move the Senate into negotiation with the Republican-controlled 
House on a compromise bill.  Consequently, Bush adjusted his articulation of the problems 
associated with immigration, the potential solutions, and his opposition, generally moving to a 
strategy of inclusion based around rationality. 
The final stage in a social movement is the consummation stage, in which the movement 
succeeds or fails.  It is the subject of chapter five.  On June 28th, 2007 the bill could not garner 
the 60 votes needed to invoke cloture, so it never went into conference with the House.  Bush 
cited the 2007 Independence Day weekend as the conclusion of CIR, marked by the moment 
when Ted Kennedy called him in Rhode Island to tell him that the bill would not reach the floor 
again.  “We believed we were within a vote or two of getting the comprehensive reform bill 
passed,” Bush recalled, but Harry Reid called for a cloture vote, which failed, and once 
“Senators went home and listened to angry constituents stirred up by the loud voices on radio 
and TV,” there was never another chance to get a compromise between the chambers (Bush, 
2010, p. 305).  Griffin explained that the consummation stage is “a time when the great 
proportion of aggressor rhetoricians abandon their efforts, either because they are convinced that 
opinion has been satisfactorily developed and the cause won, or because they are convinced that 
perseverance is useless” (Griffin, 1952, p. 186).  For Bush, perseverance was useless. 
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Finally, chapter six summarizes the study’s findings and explains how the research 
contributes to a larger theory.  While previous chapters focused on what was said and how that 
rhetoric failed, chapter six will explain why those efforts failed to achieve change.  It will also 
discuss how social movement theory can be used as an effective method in discussing 
presidential efforts like this one, tying the strategies from previous chapters together to discuss 
the overall resonance of Bush’s rhetoric over time. 
Conclusion 
While the stars were aligned for George W. Bush to pass CIR in 2006, he failed to do so, 
losing support from conservatives and poisoning further political efforts for the duration of his 
presidency.  The President faced an anti-immigration campaign waged by talk radio and right 
wing conservatives and he failed to adequately respond to it.  How and why Bush failed to 
overcome this hurdle is not well understood, and exploring it further will help explain why his 




Chapter Two: Review of Relevant Literature 
On its face, comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) does not seem particularly 
confusing.  The bill was comprised of three general provisions, each aimed at the concerns of a 
different audience.  The first provision, favored by the left, offered a clear path to citizenship for 
law-abiding immigrants who had been in the country a long time.  The second provision, aimed 
at those with economic concerns, offered temporary work-visas, an idea that would have made 
immigrants easier to monitor and ensured low-cost labor in industries that needed it.  The third 
provision, aimed at the right, greatly increased funding for border security to prevent the future 
entry of illegal immigrants.  The bill responded to the Jordan Commission’s warning that 
entering and living in the country illegally was easier than doing so legally, and required all three 
provisions to rectify the problem.  Because all three provisions were required for the bill to 
function, CIR had to pass with all three provisions at the same time. 
However, audience confusion is at the heart of much of the research regarding 
immigrants and immigration.  Media framing research, by far the largest body of academic 
research on immigration reform, took as a given that public debates were governed by mediation, 
because low-information audiences generally require the media to create explanatory frames.  
Within that research, conversation did not progress past large-scale, big-picture questions, with 
no consensus on how audiences connect immigrants to immigration reform, and therefore little 
discussion of rhetorical strategies Bush may have employed.    
Studies in presidential rhetoric offered little further explanation.  Even the ideologically-
based researchers who study metaphoric clusters made little out of Bush’s messages, either 
opting for narrower topics within the immigration debate like California’s Proposition 187 (Ono 
& Sloop, 2002) or tying limited analysis of Bush’s immigration rhetoric into larger studies of 
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other issues, as did Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) and Souders and Dillard (2014).  On Bush’s 
other rhetorical efforts, critics often reach some level of consensus, as discussion of fear appeals, 
American exceptionalism, and religiosity within Bush’s rhetoric on 9/11 or the Iraq War 
demonstrates.  On his push for immigration reform, little consensus exists.   
The rhetoric of a social movement has been likened to a drama, which is why Leland 
Griffin (1969) employed Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic method to study them.  In a three-act 
drama, the first act introduces the setting, brings in various characters, and generally introduces 
viewers to the story.  The second act introduces conflict and comes to a climax.  The final act 
resolves the conflict, and through resolution offers viewers “equipment for living” (Burke, 1973, 
p. 293) from how the conflict resolves.  Even absent the analogy of a social movement, long-
term presidential efforts imply progression and evolution, from explaining the problem, to 
crafting a response to the problem, through the eventual acceptance or rejection of the 
president’s goals. Without moving through the progression of the movement, research misses the 
ultimate goal of the movement itself, and how that purpose drives the earlier rhetoric, because 
“every movement that would recruit its followers from among many discordant and divergent 
bands, must some spot to which all roads lead” (Burke, 1973, p.192). 
This chapter explains the state of historical and rhetorical accounts into Bush’s push for 
CIR.  First, it examines popular media accounts of immigration reform and academic accounts of 
Bush’s rhetoric to demonstrate that the historical account of the time is mired in confusion, and 
that efforts to ease confusion have been hampered by ideological constraints.  Next, the chapter 
outlines the overall study of immigrants, immigration reform, and the presidency in academic 
scholarship.  Academic accounts of immigration reform fall into two general categories. The first 
category is comprised of scholarship that studies the cognitive process by which audiences 
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connected immigrants with immigration reform, as understood through media coverage, and how 
Bush could intercept or alter those explanations.  The second category is comprised of 
scholarship that connects biographical factors within the audience to explain how those traits 
influence audience predispositions towards immigrants and immigration reform efforts, and how 
Bush could rhetorically constitute subjectivity in his audience and influence attitudes.   
Historical Accounts 
In Decision Points (2010), Bush discussed his belief that the failure of CIR was 
procedural, rather than political, and that view seems to be echoed in media coverage of the time.  
Virtually all news media coverage of Bush’s efforts at the time was couched in terms of political 
gamesmanship and procedure, rather than rhetorical effect.  The procedural approach taken by 
the media is evident in how journalists focused on competition over collaboration, the confusion 
journalists had in identifying Bush’s audience on the rare occasions they discussed his audience, 
and a cynical depiction of conservatives that created a good-vs.-evil narrative. 
Studies of immigration reform focused on a narrative of competition, instead of 
compromise.  For example, the state of policy was headlined in April of 2006 as “An 
immigration impasse,” in the New York Times, one month before they published “An 
immigration victory,” with both articles focused on Bush’s ability to make deals and little 
attention paid to how he generated public support.  The impasse was marked by deadlocked 
Senators, unable to compromise, and lacking “the courage to foil the Republicans who had 
lighted the fuse on amendments intended to blow apart a pale and fragile compromise” 
(“Immigration Impasse,” 2006, para. 2). By November, impasse was ongoing, and immigration 
reform was “on hold,” because politicians had been “exploiting the illegal immigration problem 
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as a wedge issue,” (Trujillo, 2006, para. 7) according to the news media, who offered little 
analysis of the way that rhetorical leadership might resolve this problem. 
While reporting on Bush’s Tucson speech, David Greene (2005) offered the most on-
point analysis of Bush’s rhetoric, explaining the policy and offering this piece of audience 
analysis: “To try to woo his Republican skeptics, [Bush] talked about their priorities first” (para. 
6).  Unfortunately, Greene’s description of the general order in Bush’s speech would be the 
extent of his rhetorical analysis.  
Later in the same radio program, Ted Robbins (2005) further demonstrated the limited 
attention reporters focused on rhetorical strategies.  Robbins filed a story about local reaction to 
Bush’s Tucson speech, but he reported on the reactions of average Tucsonans, rather than the 
Republican lawmakers his colleague David Greene had isolated as the intended audience of the 
speech.  Confusing the issue further, Robbins reported on the opinions of those who were 
protesting the Iraq War, and did not see Bush’s speech, before summarizing the overall local 
reaction to the speech in Tucson as a prevailing feeling that  “solving the Iraq problem may seem 
easier than coming up with a solution to the problem of immigration reform” (para. 20).  Such 
reports contain no substantive analysis. 
Republican support was seen as the goal of Bush’s rhetoric throughout media coverage of 
the early phase of his push.  CIR had “divided Republicans” (Stevenson, 2005, para. 1), which 
forced Bush to emphasize “the elements that most concerned conservatives in his own party” 
(para. 3). Bush’s support of the issue was almost universally described as “an opportunity to 
strengthen his party's appeal to Hispanics, a fast-growing segment of the population” (para. 19). 
As coverage of CIR unfolded, the national news media continually elided any ideological basis 
for Republican intransigence, preferring a simple narrative pitting good against evil. 
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Fletcher and Fears (2005) wrote one of the few reports covering Bush’s speech in Tucson 
that discussed his rhetoric, noting that “Bush put his rhetorical emphasis on measures sought by 
many Republicans fearful of swelling illegal immigration” (para. 2), but reached the conclusion 
that Bush’s rhetoric was likely to fail because “the President faces an uphill battle in the House 
and Senate to realize his vision of reform, which is drawing intense skepticism from many allies 
in his own party who believe his approach is not tough enough” (para. 4).  While their analysis 
separated Bush from other Republicans, and mentions his rhetoric, they offered no meaningful 
analysis. 
The gamesmanship model effectively describes the day-to-day coverage of Bush’s 
rhetoric, in which journalists would report that he made a speech, explain the political situation, 
and then ignore the actual speech making in favor of reporting on the horse race, particularly as 
Bush’s push for CIR dragged on.  Fox News called Bush’s rhetorical efforts an attempt “to unify 
a fractious Republican Party headed to midterm elections” (“Bush outlines border,” 2005, para. 
1), while Rachel Swarns argued that members of the “Republican Party are responding to… the 
demographic shift driven by immigration in recent decades” (2006, para. 4), for fear of losing 
political ground among the swelling Latino demographic. 
Media efforts to couch immigration rhetoric in terms of gamesmanship were not limited 
to the early stages of Bush’s reform efforts. When summarizing Bush’s push for CIR, Donna 
Smith (2007) mentioned division in American opinion and observed that Bush had worked 
behind-the-scenes on compromise, but ultimately concluded that the bill failed due to Republican 
intransigence.  What little coverage the messages received during the year-long push was 
reduced to a brief mention in Smith’s report for Reuters, where she cited unnamed “analysts,” 
who attributed the failure to the clouding of the issue by partisan “think tanks and lobbyists as 
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well as…journalists and talk-show hosts and the free-wheeling exchanges of internet blogs” 
(para. 11).  
Smith’s analysis underlined the problems in press coverage of the time.  While press 
reporting is useful for providing context and data indicating that Bush’s rhetoric failed to 
resonate with the audience for which it was intended, it did not contain any significant rhetorical 
analysis.  At the same time, the idea that powerful media agents outside of the mainstream were 
able to create disinformation and confusion, particularly among the right, highlights the need for 
careful academic research in order to understand how Bush failed to prevent this conservative 
backlash. 
A single rhetorical issue that did receive attention highlights the confusion the public had 
with the issue, and the difficulty the news media had in ameliorating that confusion.  The term 
“amnesty” became incredibly popular from 2005 through 2007, particularly among Republicans, 
who were responsible for 75% of its usage (Capitolwords.org).  Writing for The New York Times 
in early 2005, as the stage was being set for Bush’s push, David Kirkpatrick reported that "many 
conservatives call the president's ideas 'amnesty' -- a term Mr. Bush disputes -- because his plan 
includes ways for currently illegal immigrants to obtain temporary worker permits" (para. 3).   
Woodruff (2014) found lawmakers’ definition of the term to be much looser than 
Kirkpatrick described.  “The word is typically shorthand for ‘bad immigration policy,’” she 
found, and “asking if a Republican supports amnesty is akin to asking if someone is beating his 
or her spouse; it’s a loaded term, and the correct answer is always no” (para. 4).  Congressional 
Republicans were “downright befuddled when asked to explain what that concept looks like in 
real life” (Woodruff, 2014, para. 3), even as they continued to use the word frequently.  Less 
befuddled was then-Republican Senator and author of the Senate version of CIR Arlen Specter, 
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who helpfully translated the Republicans’ language: “This word ‘amnesty’ is a code word.  It is a 
code word to try to smear good-faith legislation” (Milbank, 2006, para 5).  As often as the word 
was used, the media rarely pushed Republicans to explain their meaning, in spite of its seemingly 
nefarious purpose.  In an environment of confusion, Republicans were able to use a devil term to 
steer debate.   
 At the same time that media reports on immigration reform elided policy concerns and 
ignored confusing terms that obfuscated the nature of the policy.  In fact, media reporting of 
immigrants bemoaned Americans’ confusion about immigrants themselves.  Illegal immigrants 
were obscured from public view, because they were “living in the Shadows,” as the title of a San 
Diego Union-Tribune essay series proclaims (Breen, 2010).  Unlike other populations, whose 
children assimilated in schools, illegal children were “growing up in the shadows” (Gavett, 
2011), according to the title of a PBS documentary series.  Seemingly oblivious to the ubiquity 
of the metaphor, CNN (Myreport, 2013), the New York Times (Cave, 2014), and many others 
titled articles using the metaphor of the shadows.   
The repetition of the idea that immigrants are metaphorically shadowed from public view 
suggests that immigrants must be brought into the light to be seen, and only through heroic 
courage on the part of journalists can the general public see the situation at all.  Shadows evoke 
additional meanings, of course, including danger, particularly the danger of Latino violence 
against Anglos (Chavez, 2008), and ignorance, particularly Latino ignorance in contrast to Anglo 
enlightenment (Biria, 2012), implying the tension between mystery and fear people experience 
when the Other is simultaneously unknown and nearby (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011).  
Overwhelmingly, the use of the shadows in the title of a news article implies that the journalists 
are the ones that braved the danger, and did so to enlighten a confused Anglo audience.  The 
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repeated metaphor of the shadows highlights the low-information media environment 
surrounding immigration reform, and how journalists’ work in that environment contributed to 
their viewers’ confusion.  To come full circle, one report on the death of immigration reform 
used the shadows to discuss the political maneuvering on Capitol Hill, juxtaposing the 
gamesmanship of Republicans with fearful Democrats, who were learning “cowering in the 
shadows is a bust” (Trujillo, 2006, para. 7). 
The Rhetoric of George W. Bush 
A significant amount of research exists regarding George W. Bush and his rhetorical 
efforts, unsurprising for a two-term president who presided over a recent period of turmoil and 
war.  The study of Bush’s immigration rhetoric is more rare than discussion of other topics, 
because of the primacy of terror and war. As Edwards and Herder (2012) lament, “although 
rhetoricians have demonstrated a clear interest in what presidents have to say about immigrants 
and immigration we have relatively few sustained studies on the subject” (p. 42).  This section 
begins by discussing the general criticism of Bush as an orator and leader to determine themes 
within Bush’s overall rhetoric that may prove relevant to the study of immigration reform.  Once 
the general perspective is outlined, this section will turn to the limited research into Bush’s push 
for CIR, demonstrating how the ideological criticism of Bush’s discourse has shaped the study of 
this specific rhetorical moment.   
A popular criticism of Bush centered on his perceived willingness to evade the truth.  
Harnett and Mercieca (2007), for example, argued that Bush described fantasy, rather than 
reality, confounding the study of his rhetoric.  Condit (2010) similarly decried Bush’s 
unwillingness to report the truth in Abu Ghraib, and his apology for those transgressions 
promised the truth at the same time it obfuscated it from the American people (Shepard, 2007).  
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Walter Johnson (2006) claimed that Bush was unable to meet the standards of historical truth 
when he apologized for slavery, re-entrenching a history of domination.  Hyde (2005) explained 
how Bush’s inability to confront the truth behind the historical relationship between the United 
States and the Arab world prevented him from achieving rhetorical heroism.  In each of these 
cases, rhetorical critics were trying to make sense of a President who says something that seems 
false, or who omits counterfactual truths of which he is aware, as a strategy of obfuscation.  
These critics found that in cases where the truth is difficult for Bush, he evades it as much as he 
can, a damning ethical lapse for the leader of a democracy. 
For Bush, the truth that he told was often based in the certainty of faith.  Bush often 
evaded “fact-based reality,” according to Ron Suskind (2004), instead opting to deal with 
certainty based on a “weird, Messianic idea of what he thinks God has told him to do” (para. 2). 
Certainty is built into what Suskind called a faith-based presidency, in which rhetoric supersedes 
the real world. Such a faith-based approach makes it difficult for a critic to create an objective 
space in which to evaluate the rhetoric of Bush because “open dialogue, based on facts, is not 
seen as something of inherent value. It may, in fact, create doubt, which undercuts faith.  It could 
result in a loss of confidence in the decision-maker and, just as important, by the decision-
maker” (Suskind, para. 24).   
Bush’s “messianic militarist” (Smith, 2006, p. 367) faith was a particular, individualistic 
riff on the melody of protestant Christianity that was more closely aligned with Joel Osteen than 
Jimmy Carter (Smith, 2006, p. 375), This faith was broad enough to consistently incorporate 
Republican themes (Milkis & Rhodes, 2007), and flexible enough to adapt to a variety of 
contexts (Roof, 2009). For those who preferred a truth that was supported by the bedrock of the 
almighty, Bush’s religious certainty was a welcome alternative from objective reality. For those 
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who preferred the skeptical, rational truth of Jefferson and Locke, the opacity of Bush’s faith was 
frustrating.    
 Religion is hardly the only ideological division in Bush’s rhetoric, as outlined by Mary 
Stuckey (2013): “No single political fıgure presents a clearer marker of the intensity, the depth, 
and the implacability of the partisanship governing our communal life than George W. Bush” 
(p.578), Central to all of those divisions is Bush’s epistemology.  Superlatives and hyperbole are 
in no short supply, with Hartnett and Mercieca (2007) declaring that Bush’s epistemology 
represented no less than “the death of presidential rhetoric” and a paradigm shift to “the post-
rhetorical presidency” (pp. 599-600).  Not to be outdone, Porpora et al. (2013) argued that the 
paradigm shift Bush represented went beyond the function of the presidency, creating a “post-
ethical society” (p. 1).  David Domke (2004) did not see a paradigm shift, but argued that the 
fundamentalist frame at the heart of Bush’s rhetoric was pure evil, concluding that the president 
saw the 9/11 attacks “in a positive light” because the crisis gave him “a larger piece of the planet 
to work with” (pp. 177-8).  For Domke, “the ultimate irony” of Bush’s rhetoric is that it “looks, 
sounds, and feels remarkably similar to terrorists it is fighting” (179).  Perhaps the “ultimate 
irony” of Domke’s criticism is that by equating Bush and Bin Laden, his research “looks, sounds, 
and feels remarkably similar” to the fundamentalist dogma it is fighting.   
Because the aim of this study is to see how Bush failed to rally conservative support for a 
moderate, populist piece of legislation, in spite of having every possible advantage in doing so, 
this paper may be uniquely positioned to answer Stuckey’s call, which asks scholars to use 
Bush’s rhetoric “as a starting point from which we can begin to understand the contemporary 
conservative movement and the rifts that threaten to fracture it,” because “the ideological fault 
lines” (2013, p. 578) that plague conservatism to this day began with Bush’s rhetoric.  To that 
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end, this project looks at a moment Bush attempted to defend “a rational middle ground” (Bush, 
2010, p. 303) between the ideological poles of “an automatic path to citizenship” and “a program 
of mass deportation.”   
The previous study most similar to this one comes from Edwards and Herder (2012), but 
operates from an ideological perspective based on the idea that Bush pursued immigration 
reform as an act of political gamesmanship, cynically hoping to lure Latinos into the GOP’s big 
tent.  Their study is an important work of criticism that clearly outlines key frames in Bush’s 
rhetoric, but by proceeding from their ideological position, they built a model of rhetorical action 
that disregards rhetorical progression and unfairly equates conservatism with nativism.  
A less ideological study of Bush’s push for CIR comes from Souders and Dillard (2014), 
who placed Bush’s immigration address in Irvine, California within the larger context of Bush’s 
security rhetoric.  While they did not reference Goodnight (1986), their findings were similar to 
the idea that rhetorical trajectories serve as a barrier and prevent the audience from 
understanding subtle adjustments the speaker makes.  They also examined an overlooked tension 
within frame models between top-down models that assume frames originate with the 
gatekeeper, who provides them to the audience, and bottom-up models that assume the audience 
provides the frames, and the gatekeeper’s role is to invite the audience to select among them.   
This study extends their work.  It places the Irvine speech into the context of Bush’s 
overall immigration rhetoric, in order to explain how the themes he used in that speech were a 
response to earlier efforts at reform.  It also looks at later immigration rhetoric to study how 




Framing and the Information Environment 
Research focused on media framing, from Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet (1948) to 
Luntz (2007), contends that factors in selecting and presenting news stories have discernible 
effects on viewers’ attitudes toward the subject of media coverage (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007), although the extent, limits, and direction of those effects are not as well understood 
(Druckman and Holmes, 2004).  A 2007 issue of Journal of Communication was devoted to 
creating conceptual clarity among three of the key issues within media effects - framing, agenda 
setting, and priming - yet the distinction between the three is still murky (Souders & Dillard, 
2014).  Generally, framing refers to the process by which information gatekeepers explain an 
issue to an audience (Goffman, 1974; Scheufele, 1999), agenda setting is the process by which 
the relative emphasis information gatekeepers place on various topics influences the salience, or 
importance, audience members ascribe to those topics (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010; Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990), and priming is the process by which those same factors 
affect the valence audiences feel towards a topic (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Miller & 
Krosnick, 2000).  The process of explaining a complicated issue necessarily prioritizes some 
aspects of an issue over another (Vatz, 1973).  
Immigration is an issue in which the linguistic choices of information gatekeepers have 
special significance.  As Lakoff and Ferguson note to begin their 2006 study, “Framing is at the 
center of the recent immigration debate. Simply framing it as about immigration has shaped its 
politics, defining what count as ‘problems’ and constraining the debate to a narrow set of issues” 
(2006, p. 1).  Many scholars have heeded Lazarsfeld’s (1948) warning that the language choices 
of media gatekeepers are not value free when they discuss immigration, whether the research 
those scholars produce has come from a rhetorical perspective (Coutin & Chock, 1996), from a 
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policy analysis perspective (Demo, 2004), or from the legal perspective (Brabeck et al., 2011).  
When comparing the studies of immigrants, immigration, and immigration reform within 
communication studies or political science journals, the quantity of scholarship primarily focused 
on media framing dwarfs all other immigration research combined. 
In the information-poor environment of immigration reform, frames often help audiences 
fill in missing information, which can ease cognitive dissonance (Dardis et al., 2008), define a 
social problem (Kim & Willis, 2007), or simplify a complex situation (Allen et al., 1994).  
Generally, when media framing creates an explanatory frame, it creates an organizing theme to 
combine discrete information into a unified idea (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Gitlin, 1979), which 
may create or evoke a terministic screen (Burke, 1966) for the audience, often outside of the 
speaker’s control (Druckman and Holmes, 2004; Ceren, 2006).  As the media chooses which 
issues to make more or less salient, those issues rise to prominence as central concerns in the 
debate over illegal immigration, or fall away as unexamined and unimportant effluvium. 
Crime was one of the primary problems media gatekeepers consistently associated with 
illegal immigration.  When associated with the free flow of criminals into the United States, 
immigration becomes a more clear and salient issue than when discussed in the context of other 
problems (Marsh, 1991; Reiner et al., 2000). Drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other 
violent crimes are often linked to illegal immigration (Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007, p. 37), 
negatively slanting the portrayal of immigrants (Dunaway et al., 2007), which scholars speculate 
can create or increase a fear and distrust of immigrants (Kim et al., 2011).  
Edwards and Herder (2012) demonstrated that economic concerns were often used to 
frame immigration.  Mayda (2006) showed the power of the economic frame, because the fear of 
losing one’s job could focus audience attention more than virtually any other economic issue. 
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While most commonly employed to vilify illegal immigrants, the economic frame can be used to 
justify their value as well, by framing economic issues around an employer’s need for cheap 
labor (Tichenor, 2008) or by using immigrant labor to justify their inclusion in American life 
(Sainsbury, 2006). 
While framing is an effective tool for explaining media effect in many settings, it is less 
effective on immigration reform.  Even the use of a seemingly innocuous term like “immigration 
reform,” Lakoff and Ferguson (2006, p. 2) argued, can prescribe a course of action for an 
audience. However, “Immigration reform” is, in practice, an innocuous phrase.  It is a phrase that 
describes policy action and prescribes a legal solution, because governmental policy is 
synonymous with law. Their definition of the legal frame is overly general, failing to distinguish 
between the legal settings of a courtroom or a legislative body.  Their definition of the legal 
frame is also overly limited, only including illegal immigrants and agencies that deal with them, 
even though any version of a legal frame ought to imply many more actors.   
Secondly, while Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) demonstrate the difficulty immigration 
presents when creating a theoretical definition, Kim et al. (2011) highlight the methodological 
difficulty social-scientific scholars have when discussing CIR. As the number of illegal 
immigrants living in the United States doubled in the decade preceding Bush’s push for 
immigration reform (Krogstad & Passel, 2014), news coverage of illegal immigration increased 
nine fold or more, with a similarly high proportion of that media coverage depicting immigrants 
negatively (Kim et al., 2007, p. 304).  Kim and his colleagues, however, found no reason to 
suspect that the negative framing of immigrants resulted in a change in audience attitudes 
towards immigration reform.  Instead, they found an odd disjunction between media coverage of 
the problems associated with illegal immigration and the solutions to those problems.  In the 
38 
 
newspaper and television reports they studied, “Immigration Reform” and “Tougher Border 
Control,” were the two most commonly discussed solutions, but the problems to which they 
applied, “Failure of Immigration System” and “Weak Border Control,” were among the least 
commonly mentioned problems (pp. 303-4).  
 Research into presidential framing has similar problems, including overly specific frames 
unlikely to be observed by the audience, the unchecked assumption that unfavorable images of 
immigrants would affect audience attitudes towards immigration reform efforts, and limited 
discussion of contextual factors that might account for audience effects.  Most importantly, 
studies of framing do not focus in detail on the speeches in question, do not systematically 
analyze the rhetorical situation, and fail to account for rhetorical progression over time. 
As the limitations of frame research for studying CIR have become clear, alternatives 
have arisen.  Cisneros (2008) combined framing with analysis of metaphoric clusters, which are 
“more than linguistic ornamentation,” because they “affect political behavior and cognition” 
(Cisneros, 2008, p. 570).  On immigration, Cisneros (2008) highlighted the use of metaphors of 
dirtiness and pollution regarding immigrants. Building off previous studies showing “dominant 
assumptions about the danger of ‘illegal’ immigration by focusing on nativist, racist, and 
xenophobic justifications for immigration restriction,” (p. 571), including work by Kent Ono and 
John Sloop (2002), who studied the nativist metaphors of California’s proposition 187, and Otto 
Santa Ana (1999), who offered a broad taxonomy of metaphoric clusters, Cisneros extended the 
scope of analysis to visual metaphors and nature, explaining that contemporary discourse treated 
immigrants as an unnatural pollutant.  It is unclear if the audience actually associated immigrants 
with images of toxic waste, but by mapping connections, Cisneros and other ideological critics 
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can help explain how messages connect with each other to associate seemingly unrelated factors 
in a single, coherent frame. 
Another variant of framing research focused on moral frames based in orthodoxy or 
progressiveness, building from the work of Lakoff and various collaborators (Lakoff, 1996; 
2014; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; Lakoff & The Rockridge Institute, 2006).  Mayda (2006) 
explained that material concerns regarding immigration are often outweighed by moral concerns, 
particularly when viewed in the context of preexisting moral frameworks. News agencies are 
often uncomfortable discussing moral or spiritual issues, due to standards of journalistic 
objectivity, and therefore were constrained to discussing immigration as a purely material 
concern.  Academic research has no such constraints, and deep moral frames have been used to 
discuss Bush’s religious rhetoric in the 2004 election (Spielvogel, 2005) and how other powerful 
information gatekeepers have framed immigrants. 
While no study currently connects deep moral frames with George W. Bush’s push for 
CIR, Levasseur et al (2011) discussed how such frames, when employed by other information 
gatekeepers, place immigrants outside the national family, and unworthy of the same attention of 
natural-born citizens.  This study will extend work by Levasseur et al. to presidential 
immigration discourse and generally connect Lakoff et al.’s work to a social movement structure 
to see how an invitation to participate in a frame can evolve or progress over time.  Overall, 
framing research provides useful information on how the audience understood immigration 
reform, but adds little to the analysis of Bush’s rhetorical strategies on the issue. 
Audience Factors 
While chapter one introduced several key polls - and polls of polls - from the time of 
Bush’s push for CIR (Pew, 2006; Segovia & Defever, 2010; Muste, 2013), the agencies in 
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charge of such polls rarely, if ever, segregated their findings across audience identity factors or 
held those factors constant over time. When Segovia and Defever (2010) argued, “the public 
appears conflicted and ambivalent about immigration” (p. 376), they did so without indicating 
the importance of audience division across political party.  On most controversial issues, the 
American public is conflicted and ambivalent if looked at as a whole.  
Academic research into audience is better, but also incomplete.  Generally, research 
looking at identity factors as a predictor of audience attitudes has focused on white and native-
born attitudes towards immigrants (Leighley, 2001; Johnson, Stein & Wrinkle, 2003), finding 
stark splits in the salience of immigration based on geography and religion.  While these studies 
generally control for race, they do so in limited ways, either constructing race as a binary 
between Hispanics and Anglos or between Hispanics and all other races, taking party 
membership as a given, often failing to mention it entirely.  With these limitations in mind, 
findings on geography and religion offer insight into audience predispositions, providing a 
deeper context than the explanation of audience from chapter one, and constructing a starting 
point for narrower explanations of the situated audiences for each of Bush’s addresses in the 
analysis chapters to come. 
In each stage of Bush’s push for CIR, Bush chose to deliver a large-scale national address 
in Arizona, California, or Florida, suggesting that border states were key to addressing his 
audience, because border state residents had more in common with each other than with they did 
with the rest of the country.  According to previous research, border state residence is a key 
predictor of audience attitudes towards immigration, either due to a perceived threat from outside 
forces entering border communities (Quillian, 1995; Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005) or through 
the understanding that stems from personal experience (Pettigrew, 1998, 2006; Dixon, 2006; 
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Oliver & Wong, 2003).  Studies of the time in which Bush spoke indicate that local news in 
border states was more likely to focus on crime (Branton & Dunaway, 2009a; 2009b) than any 
other aspect of illegal immigration, constraining Bush’s rhetoric among local audiences.   
A second key determinant of audience attitudes toward immigration is religious ideology. 
Wuthnow (1988) and Hunter (1991) contended that the major split in American religious 
ideology that affects political attitudes is not between religious denominations, but between 
“traditionalists,” who are generally more faithful to normative religious practices and 
“modernists,” who are less likely to allow religion to prescribe their political or social stances.  
Knoll (2009) found a significant positive relationship between traditionalist religious behaviors 
and liberal attitudes towards immigration reform, suggesting that religiosity has as profound of 
an effect on attitudes as “socioeconomic characteristics, economic perceptions, and racial/ethnic 
context” (p. 329).  Overall, Knoll offered strong evidence that individuals “take into 
consideration undocumented immigrants when they ask themselves the biblical query: "And who 
is my neighbor?” (p. 329). 
Conclusion 
The review of literature suggests that illegal immigration represents a series of 
interconnected problems, with solutions often at odds with each other. Public understanding is 
crafted through a series of media and presidential lenses simultaneously clarifying and 
obfuscating debate. Into this heated and confusing crossfire, George W. Bush entered with the 
baggage of an ideologue, under attack as a partisan, a liar, and a demagogue.  Media coverage of 
his efforts fails to account for his rhetorical efforts on the subject, preferring to look at the 




Academic discussion of George W. Bush on the topic of immigration reform presents 
several rhetorical dimensions of interest.  Presidential framing suggests the potential power of 
narrowing discussion, while constitutive rhetoric suggests the power of broadening discussion. 
More recent framing research highlights the difference between top-down and bottom-up models 
of speaker-audience interactions, highlighting through analogy a similar split between top-down 
constitutive efforts on behalf of the president and bottom-up models of civic engagement.  
Research into audience attitudes towards immigration suggests a split between material problems 
and moral solutions in the minds of Americans, although that split has received little academic 
attention.  Previous studies have collapsed these dimensions, focusing only on one side of each, 
due to the ideological blinders critics have when they discuss Bush or the limitations of the 
theories they use to study his rhetoric.  By proceeding inductively, and tying Bush’s rhetoric to 




Chapter Three: A Rhetoric of Borrowed Heroism 
When George W. Bush delivered “The Future of Immigration Reform” in Tucson, 
Arizona on November 28, 2005, he touched on themes of crime, security, and American values, 
while praising the collection of Border Patrol agents who had gathered to hear him speak.  Bush 
tied border security to crime, largely ignoring the economic benefits of immigration that 
dominated his immigration rhetoric throughout his first term, and toning down the calls for 
compassion that marked his discussion of the topic during the 2000 presidential election 
campaign.  While those earlier themes remained in his 2005 address, crime and security were 
much more central to his rhetoric.  Bush referred to the disparate policy ideas around border 
security and a temporary worker program only in general terms, because the details of the bills 
Congress was prepared to consider were still in the early stages of negotiation, but he made clear 
that he favored an approach that balanced border security with Democrat-friendly provisions, 
even as the speech heavily featured crime. 
Purpose 
The purposes of rhetoric in the inception stage of a social movement is generally 
understood, having changed little from Griffin’s (1952) writing to Stewart et al.’s (2007). Those 
purposes include garnering attention for a cause, developing consensus about the nature of the 
problem, and motivating potential followers to join the movement or increase their commitment.  
President-driven movements have additional burdens in the inception stage, because the 
president has to demonstrate that the problem cannot be solved by acting within the system.  




In Tucson, Bush needed to fulfill all of the purposes of social movements and satisfy the 
additional burdens of president-driven movements.  To do so, his primary purpose was to lay the 
groundwork for a common understanding of immigration, which could garner attention and 
develop consensus. Bush’s second purpose was demonstrating the need for a social movement, 
which involved creating a perception of governmental inaction that would justify his acting 
outside the system, articulating the need for audience involvement, and constructing Bush as the 
most appropriate leader for the nascent social movement.  
A final purpose for Bush stems from going public’s media framing function, in which 
strategies that appear public facing are often “designed largely to influence the media” because 
“media ‘translate’ presidential messages and influence how they are understood by ordinary 
citizens” (Zarefsky, 2004, 611).  While chapter two questioned the overall effectiveness of 
presidential and media framing, media-facing strategies of going public can be particularly 
effective at influencing local media coverage (Cohen, 2010), partially due to a change in strategy 
resulting from the limited success recent presidents have had “going national” (P.4).  Skeptics of 
going public, like George Edwards (2003), support the notion that the strategy can affect media 
coverage, and Kim et al. (2011) highlight that local media coverage of immigration varies wildly 
from national coverage, supporting the idea that Bush’s media-facing strategies of going public 
may have been designed to influence his local audience through media coverage.  
Barriers 
Consensus is rare in the inception period, even under ideal circumstances, and chapter 
one highlighted how the circumstances surrounding immigration reform were far from ideal.  
Illegal immigration was seen variously as a criminal problem, an economic problem, and a 
humanitarian problem, although individual audience members were likely to see those concerns 
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as contradictory and exclusive, often supporting one perspective of the problem while 
discounting others. Local support for comprehensive reform efforts was made more elusive by 
local attitudes that closely associated immigrants with violent crimes, often ignoring economic or 
humanitarian concerns along the border. 
Illegal immigration was a particularly salient issue in America at the time, as explained in 
chapter one, but the issue was even more consequential to those living in border communities.  
As an issue’s salience increases, so do the limits on what an audience will accept from 
presidential rhetoric (Rottinghaus, 2006), often leading presidents to change their public stance 
on an issue or ignore it entirely, suggesting that when discussing illegal immigration, Bush had 
to define problems and solutions from among options already familiar to his audience and do so 
very carefully. Bush needed to focus on crime, because Arizonans were particularly focused on 
that aspect of immigration as evidenced by local media coverage.  In every month of 2005, at 
least one issue of The Arizona Daily Star featured a front-page story about immigrants 
committing crimes, and for most months, the newspaper featured several. In addition to human 
trafficking and the illegal drug trade, Arizonans read about a variety of other crimes associated 
with illegal immigrants in 2005.  Immigrants were sexually assaulting children (“British 
immigrant arrested,” 2005), trafficking in human body parts (Hays, 2005) and endangering locals 
with hit-kill-and-run accidents (Tobin & Ellis, 2005).  
Multiple proposals in both chambers of Congress contributed to audience confusion 
about competing policies, and Bush needed to strike a delicate balance between articulating a 
clear immigration problem and a solution that would include all of the provisions he wanted.  He 
could not downplay criminal concerns, because if he did, his argument would not justify the 
significant increase in border security that his plan outlined.  He also could not use the 
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Manichean frame typically associated with foreign criminals, depicting a moral struggle between 
“good” citizens and “evil” immigrants, because vilifying immigrants would risk losing support 
for the temporary worker program and path to citizenship he favored.  Essentially, he could not 
insist on any single problem representing the fundamental nature of the controversy surrounding 
immigrants, because to do so would invalidate his call for a comprehensive program addressing 
many issues at once. 
Focusing audience attention was difficult for Bush, and one of the primary difficulties he 
faced stemmed from a lack of a salient, striking event around which he could focus his rhetoric. 
While more immigrants had died crossing the border in 2005 than any previous year (Hendricks, 
2005), few Americans noticed or cared.  Even fewer seemed concerned that the deadline for the 
1986 amnesty was approaching in December, and that no replacement policy was in place 
(Prengaman, 2005).  Americans were unconcerned with the salient events affecting immigrants; 
they were concerned with how immigrants affected American life. Unfortunately for those who 
wanted immigration to receive public attention, there had been no specific crisis that could be 
tied directly to immigrants, there was no Elian Gonzalez to put a face on immigrant concerns, 
and even the terrorists responsible for the attacks on September 11th were in the country legally.  
Somehow, the illegal immigrant population in America had doubled, but it had done so through 
slow accumulation over half a century, with no clearer explanation than life was better north of 
the Rio Grande (Economist, 2005). 
With Congress developing immigration proposals, Bush needed to act quickly, but 
without a salient event around which he could develop his rhetoric, it was difficult to maintain 
his audience’s attention and ease their confusion.  Bush’s previous immigration rhetoric had 
failed to overcome audience barriers of attention and confusion stemming from local attitudes 
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and media coverage, often addressing immigration in national speeches while downplaying or 
ignoring the criminal concerns with which border communities were preoccupied.  
Unsurprisingly, he had failed to generate public support on the issue.  In Tucson, he needed a 
new approach. 
Strategic Patterns 
With the president’s purpose and barriers understood, it is important to consider the 
strategies he used to overcome those barriers.  Generally, “The Future of Immigration Reform” is 
divided into three sections, with the first two explaining that increased border security could curb 
illegal crossing and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin.  The third major section 
focused on the benefits of a guest worker program, explaining the effectiveness such a policy 
would have in supporting border security efforts and improving the economy.  As a whole, the 
speech operated from a thesis that illegal immigration forced America to choose between 
welcoming newcomers and upholding laws, and that CIR would allow America to do both. 
Within that broad framework, Bush used a variety of more subtle strategies to redefine 
illegal immigration and the players within reform efforts. First, he wanted to define himself as 
heroic, by associating his actions with those of the Border Patrol.  Next, he wanted to make 
Congress into villains, describing them as out of touch bureaucrats, associating them with human 
smugglers, and dissociating them from American values.  Finally, he wanted to expand the 
definition of citizenship to include immigrants who embraced American values, so that the 
righteousness of his cause would be readily apparent for his audience.  To do so, he constructed a 
conflict between Border Patrol agents and the smugglers of illegal immigrants, generally referred 
to as coyotes, playing out at along the border, into which he could place immigrants, political 
opponents, and himself, creating new associations that redefined each of the stakeholders. 
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David Zarefsky (2004) explained that “by defining a situation,” presidents “might be able 
to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public” (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 
611), which is particularly important at the outset of a movement, when the president has to 
define the “events” precipitating the movement and the “proposals” for solving the problem to 
which the movement responds. Stewart et al. (2007) provided some insights into how movement 
leaders articulate the movement itself, many of which are tied to strategies of presidential 
definition.  Movements seek “to replace existing norms and values with new ones” (Stewart et 
al., 2007, p. 12) that show the movement’s “cause as one that any virtuous individual may 
endorse” (Stewart et al., 2007, p. 15), suggesting that the definition Bush offered would need to 
define the norms and values of the status quo as faulty, while those tied to his movement were 
plainly virtuous, in order to convince the public that their actions could effect change in a way 
that Bush could not. 
While Bush’s redefinition of immigration explained “the clusters of what goes with 
what” (Burke, 1973, p. 77) he also organized the Tucson address along a progressive form to 
show his audience the development “from what to what” (Burke, 1973, p. 82).  Rhetorical form 
“is an arousing and fulfillment of desires” (Burke, 1968, p. 124), and progressive form can 
influence “the audience to anticipate or desire certain developments” (Burke, 1968, p. 54) rather 
than others.  To do so, Bush used a familiar situation to explain the perspective from which his 
audience should view illegal immigration, and then applied that scenario to increasingly 
unfamiliar situations. 
Locality as a worldview.  Redefining immigration reform was a large task.  The first 
step in doing so was to develop a cognitive schema that was flexible enough to explain a variety 
of scenarios while remaining simple enough for his audience to accept.  Bush created a 
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definitional worldview that favored local knowledge and urged his audience to use their 
experience to evaluate policy options by demonstrating that his proposal was common sense and 
had a tangible effect locally.  Bush wanted “straight-forward” (para. 16) and “common sense” 
(para. 17) reforms “that people of Arizona will like” (para. 39).  Bush had already passed 
policies that had an effect “in Tucson” (para. 24) or “in Arizona” (para. 28), “making people who 
live close to the border more secure” (para. 27), while Congress needed to end “senseless rules” 
(para. 19) that created a “cycle of endless litigation” (para 20), obstructing justice.    
Bush cited his experience as a border-state governor to build credibility and identification 
early in his speech, telling his audience “as a former governor, I know that enforcing the law and 
the border is especially important to the communities along the border” (para. 7). Bush further 
built his credibility by consistently associating himself with the Border Patrol, the most local part 
of the immigration apparatus.  Bush demonstrated his relationship with the Border Patrol, 
explaining that he had passed policies to increase their funding (para. 8), hire more agents (para. 
22), and provide them cutting-edge technology (para. 24).  Working to connect himself to the 
Border Patrol and local communities, he explained that the bulk of the Border Patrol agents he 
hired would “be assigned right here in the state of Arizona” (para. 22). 
Bush established that local knowledge was the best way to understand illegal 
immigration.  He associated himself with locals through being a border-state governor and 
through the Border Patrol, creating a close network of positive identifications among the three.  
Once he had associated himself, the Border Patrol, and border communities in a cluster around 
locality, a final way that Bush created a worldview in the speech was by using distance to mark 
his progressive form.  He discussed immigration as a conflict in a variety of scenarios, 
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dissociating local conflict from national ones, creating separate levels on which the conflict of 
immigration reform could play out.   
         Local Conflict.  The most salient problem locals associated with illegal immigration was 
crime, and Bush had little choice but to establish the conflict between police and criminals as the 
setting for conflict. He had to show his audience that his plan would stop crime before any other 
concerns could be addressed. 
Bush’s depiction of the scenario at the border involved recasting which parties were 
associated with which roles in a traditional conflict built around crime.  Traditionally, illegal 
immigrants were described in criminal scenarios as outsiders who committed property crimes, 
perpetrated acts of violence, joined gangs, or similarly harmed society (Edwards & Herder, 
2012).  Residents of border communities were the victims of crime in those scenarios. 
Bush discussed crime very differently. He granted that the presence of illegal immigrants 
broke the law in general terms, but he denied them the agency to commit specific crimes or 
inflict harm, and he associated the danger of crime with other actors.  In Bush’s scenario, 
immigrants were victims of forces outside their control, unlikely to harm locals.  His first 
reference to illegal immigrants was “those who enter the country illegally violate the law” (para. 
6), a phrase that simultaneously renders judgment that immigrants are acting illegally while 
attributing criminal acts to events, rather than a state of being within immigrants.  Coyotes, he 
explained, were the ones who brought “illegal immigrants across the border,” blaming the 
presence of illegal immigrants on the smugglers, simultaneously dehumanizing the immigrants 
and stripping them of agency.  Those “vicious human-smugglers” were the ones who brought 
“crime to our neighborhoods and danger to the highways” (para. 7).  Coyotes’ motivations were 
sinister, unlike illegal immigrants, whose desire to be in America demonstrated their similarity to 
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natural-born citizens. Immigrants were trying to access “schools and hospitals” (para. 7), do “an 
honest day’s labor” (para. 35) to “provide for their families” (para. 34), and uphold American 
values including “liberty and civic responsibility, equality under God and tolerance for others” 
(para. 42). 
Blame is incredibly powerful, as social scientists working on attribution theory have 
confirmed since Fritz Heider’s seminal (1944) “Social perception and phenomenal causality,” 
even when used implicitly.  Unfortunately for Bush, subtlety is not an effective strategy when 
attributing criminality in a high-salience environment (Miller, Burgoon & Hall, 2007), 
particularly when framing illegal immigration (Hayes, 2008).  He chose not to make the overt 
claim that coyotes were the root of crime, in fact he did not use the word coyote at all.   
Throughout the speech he repeated the same subtle pattern that dissociated immigrants 
and dangerous crimes; whenever he discussed a crime that harmed local communities, he did so 
while removing agency for the crime from the immigrants themselves.  For example, when 
discussing illegal immigrants returned to local communities through catch and release programs, 
he mentioned “murderers, rapists, child molesters, and other violent criminals” (para. 19), but did 
not identify them as illegal immigrants, instead using the unnecessarily impersonal and 
extremely clunky phrase “those whom we’re forced to release have included” (para. 19), 
implying that many who were released were not criminals, and the criminals were forced onto 
local communities by a faceless and uncaring bureaucratic system. Unfortunately for Bush, it 
also placed immigrants in close association with murderers, rapists, and child molesters, which 
made the cognitive leap between immigrants and criminals much simpler than one which 
avoided the connection. Similarly, when Bush discussed Border Patrol successes, he dissociated 
immigrants from crime.  He claimed that when the Border Patrol found drugs “on the border” 
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(para. 23), they also found immigrants, as if the two were helpless chattel being smuggled by an 
outside party, but his audience was far more likely to pick up on the close association between 
immigrants and drugs than they were to follow Bush’s direct association to a nameless third 
party.  Even when illegal immigration “put pressure” (para. 7) on government agencies, Bush 
argues that government agencies were distant and faceless, and offered no specific scenarios in 
which immigrants hurt local communities.  
It would have been much simpler, and far more striking, for Bush to blame immigrants in 
each scenario.  An audience would be more likely to support border security if immigrants were 
murderers, rapists, and drug smugglers.  Immigrants would seem far more alien if he ignored 
their children, or demonstrated that those children hurt educational outcomes for natural-born 
children.  As outsiders, they could easily be accused of subverting American values, justifying a 
variety of actions.  In his terror rhetoric, he had no problem making many of those claims, often 
to great success.  Bush’s choice to make immigrants passive participants was intentional, and it 
came at a cost.  
 In Bush’s version of the local conflict, the heroic police force tasked with combating 
coyotes was the Border Patrol.  Unlike immigrants, the Border Patrol was vivid, personal, and 
full of action and agency.  They were the direct audience to whom Bush gave the speech, 
represented on the stage through their leadership and through the presence of helicopters.  Bush 
praised their dedication, “working around the clock” (para. 2) to keep local communities safe. 
Border Patrol agents were brave, honorable, and effective, consistently combating coyotes, many 
of whom had criminal records (para. 8). 
Bush established himself as the leader of the Border Patrol, arguing that their 
effectiveness came from his financial and technological support (para. 24).  Border Patrol agents’ 
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bravery and values were similar to Bush’s, who had “a solemn duty” to protect the country 
“every single day” (para. 5).  When the Border Patrol devoted themselves to protecting “our 
nation, our Constitution, and our laws” (para. 5), they did so as an extension of Bush’s personal 
devotion. 
National conflict. On a national scale, illegal immigration was depicted as a conflict 
between the executive agencies tasked with controlling illegal immigration and a faceless system 
that undermined those agencies’ success.  Generally, Bush laid out a variety of scenarios in 
which executive agencies created a good plan, agents of that plan worked in good faith, and then 
the nonsensical demands of a faceless bureaucracy prevented any change.  On the national level, 
the conflict needed a villain, and Bush suggested his audience view large corporations, foreign 
governments and Congress similarly to how the audience viewed coyotes, as sinister agents 
exploiting immigrants and locals.   
 One scenario in which Bush highlighted the national dimension of immigration conflict 
was his worksite enforcement far from the border, in which distant and impersonal institutions 
used immigrants to generate profits, in violation of American values.  Bush directly associated 
the worksite enforcement scenario with local conflict, developing a progression from border 
security to interior enforcement and another progression from interior enforcement to work site 
enforcement. “Better interior enforcement begins with better work site enforcement” (para. 29), 
Bush explained, and “border security and interior enforcement go hand in hand” (para. 32). 
In the worksite scenario, businesses were put in the place of coyotes, subverting 
American values through profiting off of illegal immigrants.  Businesses, like the coyotes, 
retained the agency necessary to commit the crime, and immigrants were again helpless pawns.  
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Corporations were taking advantage of a broken system, ignoring their “obligation to abide by 
the law” (para. 29).  
Corporations were rendered impersonal, and therefore distant, from local businesses.  
Large, distant companies subverted American values in order to profit off of illegal immigrants, 
while “even the most diligent” small businesses were the victims of “sophisticated forgeries” 
(para. 33).  Once again, distant bureaucracies had made life difficult for locals, who “shouldn’t 
have to act like detectives” (para. 33) to determine if they were acting legally.  Bush had 
expanded programs to help small businesses cut through the bureaucracy, casting the difference 
between his common sense and the bureaucracy of the status quo into stark relief. 
The hero in the worksite enforcement scenario was Bush, as evidenced by his efforts to 
cut through bureaucracy and punish lawbreakers.  Corporations had evaded immigration laws 
“across all of America” (para. 29) in the past, but Bush’s “sustained commitment” (para. 30) to 
border security increased funding for investigators, “and those good folks [were] working hard” 
(para. 30) to combat corporate malfeasance.  Bush orchestrated a massive operation against 
businesses violating American laws, resulting “in the arrest of hundreds of illegal immigrants, 
criminal convictions against a dozen employers, and a multi-million dollar payment from one of 
America’s largest corporations” (para. 30).  Bush’s strategy could “break the cycle” (para. 11) 
perpetuated by a faceless system.  
Bush and those working on the ground were heroes.  The villains of the scenario were 
representatives of a distant system, and illegal immigrants were caught up as pawns of something 
larger than themselves.  Within that framework, Bush briefly touched on a variety of other 
scenarios that applied conflict to national struggles, each of which was based around distance. 
When he discussed interior repatriation, he explained that his plan sent immigrants “to their 
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homes, far from the border” (para. 11), demonstrating that he understood how distance could 
interfere with acting locally. Similarly, immigrants from Latin America were made more difficult 
to deal with because of distance.  The solutions to all of these problems were local, and already 
put into action by Bush: he increased the number of beds in detention centers, which increased 
the amount of time security personnel had before they needed to release immigrants, and he was 
“cutting through the bureaucracy” (para. 16) Congress unwisely created, to process immigrants 
“through the system more quickly” (para. 15).  By the time he discussed the upcoming policy 
debate, Bush had associated distance with his Congressional opposition through the villains in 
his stories.  
Eternal conflict.  While discussion of the relationship between crime and border security 
dominated the first two sections of the speech, the final major section turned its attention to the 
relationship between economics, American values, and a temporary worker program.  The 
current immigration system forced Americans “to choose between a welcoming society and a 
lawful society,” while Bush’s plan offered “both at the same time” (para. 6).  Other proposals 
maintained the “the old and tired choices of the immigration debate” (para. 40) between being “a 
compassionate nation that values the newcomer” (para. 5) and upholding the law.  Any proposal 
that did not include compassion and uphold the law ought to be rejected, Bush argued, in favor 
of “a strategy to enforce our laws, secure our country, and uphold our deepest values” (para. 40).  
The distinction Bush made between compassion and lawfulness was a simple division 
that explained competing policy proposals to his audience –the rule of law was shorthand for 
Republican-favored security proposals, while compassion and welcoming were shorthand for a 
Democrat-friendly temporary worker program.  The rule of law was intimately tied to border 
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security and crime, while American compassion was tied to a temporary worker program that 
allowed immigrants a legal path to citizenship through gainful employment. 
Having established himself as a heroic champion of the rule of law when discussing 
crime, Bush sought to demonstrate the uniqueness of his leadership in upholding compassion.  
Crime was an insufficient justification for compassion, and Bush did not try to create that 
association.  Instead, the material concern from which he began his progressive form was tied to 
economics.  Bush offered a proposal that “would create a legal way to match willing foreign 
workers with willing American employers to fill jobs that Americans will not do” (para. 33).  His 
statement assumed the need for immigrant labor could not be met under current laws, which was 
supported by his discussion of worksite enforcement.  He also took for granted that the jobs 
being done by immigrants did not interfere with American workers, attempting to assuage his 
local audience’s concerns over competing with cheap workers.  Bush had not had success with 
similar appeals in the past, having referenced the “jobs Americans won’t do” three times in a 
2003 immigration speech, and in several previous State of the Union addresses, but he tried 
again while speaking more locally.  His spoke of a clear economic benefit to locals, allowing 
them to profit off of immigrant labor without subverting American values.   
America took “great pride in our immigrant heritage” (para. 7), because the nation was 
“strengthened by generations of immigrants who became Americans through patience and hard 
work and assimilation” (para. 42).  Assimilation was important to Bush’s discussion, and he tied 
the idea into American history to demonstrate its importance.  Immigrants could learn and 
display American values, by doing an honest day’s work and providing for a family (para. 6-7).    
Labor was essential to Bush’s distinction between the rule of law and American 
compassion, especially when he discussed amnesty.  As a term, amnesty is very loosely defined 
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and poorly understood, but for Bush the definition was clear and important.  He defined amnesty 
as an automatic path to citizenship, and explained that his proposal “wouldn't provide for 
amnesty -- I oppose amnesty” (para. 36) because amnesty was an injustice that rewarded “those 
who have broken the law” and would make the border less secure by encouraging “others to 
break the law” (para. 36).  Because conservatives opposed amnesty, he discussed it as a security 
concern.  However, the compassionate perspective he offered allowed for a path to citizenship, 
because Bush supported “increasing the number of annual green cards that can lead to 
citizenship” (para. 37).  For Bush, the important distinction was that citizenship was not granted 
automatically, it was earned through participation in the workforce, clearly explaining the 
connection between Democratic proposals and compassion, but disassociating those proposals 
from amnesty.   
In the conflict among American values, immigrants who assimilated by earning wages 
and “learned our customs and values” (para. 41) were heroes, along with Bush, the Border 
Patrol, and the local communities.  Those immigrants upheld the law and American values.  
Bureaucracy stood in the way, assigned the villainous role as it had been in previous 
associations.  He said that local politicians could reform the system, noting “our Arizona 
Congressmen are building strong support for border enforcement among their colleagues” (para. 
37), and he urged Congress to “rise to the occasion” (para. 39) by passing a good bill” (para. 37), 
based on comprehensive reform that would “add to this country's security, to our prosperity, and 
to justice” (para. 39). In fact, the Senate had already passed a bill that included a temporary 
worker program along with border security provisions, and Bush expressed confidence that the 
“people of Arizona will like” the final Senate version, because Senators McCain and Kyl were 
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“two good men taking the lead” (para. 38) and could be trusted to act with compassion while 
upholding the law. 
Bush’s strategies were complex, using abstract concepts like space to organize 
associations among military and security issues.  He wanted to create potential movement 
between multiple dimensions of understanding immigration, so that he could exploit the 
complexity of the issue at the same time he simplified it for his audience.  He hoped to 
strengthen his security bona fides to garner support from the right, while maintaining enough 
subtle nods in the direction of the left that they would not abandon him.  It was a well thought-
out strategy but it did not work.  In fact, it resulted in an incredible amount of backlash, as the 
right picked up on his subtle nods to the left, who simultaneously only responded to the security 
rhetoric intended for the right. 
Response 
In Tucson, the shift in Bush’s rhetorical strategy from his earlier discussion of the issue 
marked the beginning of Bush’s push for CIR. Bush succeeded at effectively defining the the 
beginning of a new effort.  This was the necessary first step to gaining attention and placing 
himself in the role of movement leader. Popular media accounts of the time, particularly among 
news outlets close to the border, picked up on the shift in Bush’s rhetoric and were quick to 
proclaim that “The Future of Immigration Reform” marked a new moment for Bush.  The speech 
“launched a new push” (Quijano, 2005, para. 1) in which Bush was “reversing the priorities he 
had set out” (Lochhead, 2005, para. 1) in earlier speeches, including “his onetime campaign vow 
that ‘family values do not stop at the Rio Grande’” (Lochhead, 2005, para. 11).  The few national 
media outlets that commented on the speech were equally effusive.  Bush was acting “more 
rationally” (Economist, 2005, para. 16) than he had on the topic previously in hopes of pleasing 
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“as many grumblers as he can” (Economist, 2005, para. 12), while increasingly “talk[ing] tough 
about illegal immigrants” (Tobin & Medrano, 2005, para. 1).    
The speech struck a balance between welcoming immigrants and threatening those who 
entered the country illegally, but the farthest-out wings of both parties seemed unhappy with the 
balance Bush struck.  Ted Kennedy, who would eventually become Bush’s closest ally on 
immigration reform, called for Bush to “demonstrate leadership by saying no to his right-wing 
allies who want to close our borders” (Lochhead, 2005, para. 27). 
On the other side of the political spectrum, Neal Boortz, a conservative talk radio host, 
jumped on Bush’s denial that his plan amounted to amnesty, proclaiming “now we’ve finally 
caught the president in a lie” (Economist, 2005, para. 18).  Boortz and his colleagues represented 
a serious threat to Bush’s message, because right wing talk radio had sunk Bush’s previous 
efforts on immigration reform.  As Linda Chavez, a former Bush nominee for labor secretary, 
noted on another occasion “There was such a backlash from social conservatives, the 
administration was not able to go anywhere with its guest worker program” (Lochhead, 2005, 
para. 18).  Bush needed Boortz and other right-wing opinion leaders on his side early on during 
this push, or immigration reform was unlikely to move forward. 
Online, the right wing was even more vehemently opposed to Bush’s new direction on 
immigration.  On the popular conservative discussion board The Free Republic, commenters 
universally panned Bush’s speech, his policy proposal, and his credibility on immigration.  In the 
thread dedicated to “The Future of Immigration Reform,” readers swapped pictures of Israel’s 
militarized fence, longing for immigrants to be treated similarly to Palestinians. “I’m tired of this 
invasion from Mexico” (Freerepublic.com, 2005, “dennisw”), one commenter explained, and 
Israel’s fence had been “designed to succeed!! [sic] Sensors, surveillance cameras, lots of barbed 
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wire, ditches to stop vehicles from ramming through it, paved access roads for fast armed 
response etc etc [sic]” (Freerepublic.com, 2005, “dennisw”).  The most popular comment on the 
thread, dennisw’s tirade represented a growing right-wing dissatisfaction with Bush.  One typical 
comments was “GW has to put some skin in the game with some serious enforcement before I'll 
even consider his anti American amnesties…Shape up GW. We don't like your mealy mouth lip 
service to enforcement. We've [been] fooled too many times by lies… about enforcing our 
immigration and deportation laws” (freerepublic.com, 2005, “dennisw”).  Commenter nicmarlo 
believed Bush’s border security efforts were disingenuous, arguing “The weasal [sic] word is 
‘catch’. All a law enforcement officer has to do is drive out to the parking lot of most any home 
improvement store to ‘catch’ a whole bunch” (freerepublic.com, 2005).  The thread went on to 
call Bush “impotus x-42,” “El Presidente Bush,” and recast the speech to the tune of a song from 
“The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas.”   
It’s possible that Bush saw the hyperbolic reaction of the far right as a victory.  He may 
have been trying to craft support from the political center of America and distancing himself 
from the far right could help him differentiate his leadership on this issue from more 
conservative approaches.  The right wing was unlikely to support his plan, so losing their support 
would not actually cost Bush much direct support.  Bush may have seen it as a success, simply 
because it would be untenable to manage a movement that appealed to the far right while also 
attracting liberals, moderates, and Latinos, all of whom were more likely to support a plan that 
included guest worker provisions than one without them.  As the far right vilified Bush, he hoped 
that the left would see a common enemy against whom they could ally themselves. 
If this was his judgment, he underestimated the potential backlash.  Many journalists 
following immigration reform at the time would later blame much of Bush’s failure on talk radio 
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and conservative blogs (Smith, 2007; Fletcher and Fears, 2007), and Bush eventually conceded 
the difficulty right wing media caused him (Bush, 2010; Limbaugh, 2010c).  Outraged by Bush’s 
proposal on immigration reform, the next few months would see a prolonged campaign to smear 
Bush’s reforms by labelling them as an amnesty for acknowledged criminals.  Capitolwords.org 
tracks the use various words in Congressional speeches, and the popularity of amnesty 
skyrocketed immediately after the Tucson address.  While the word had been used occasionally 
before, from as early as the Reagan administration, it had never seen such widespread usage.  
The term would remain popular for the rest of Bush’s push, spiking after each of his subsequent 
addresses on the topic.  The strategy was so successful that the use of the word spiked again, 
following a nearly identical pattern during Barack Obama’s push for CIR.  
Bush used the word amnesty in his speech only three times, each time in the context of 
vehemently opposing it.  His limited use of the term may have been designed to force news 
coverage to show Bush denouncing it, and if so, it was successful.  News coverage universally 
reported that Bush opposed amnesty and often quoted him saying so.  Unfortunately for Bush, 
his limited use of the word encouraged reporters to ask other politicians about amnesty, and no 
shortage of Republican Congresspersons and political analysts argued that Bush supported 
amnesty, characterizing Bush’s plan as weak and dishonest. 
Still, conservatives typically were not “as xenophobic as their bumper stickers” 
(Economist, 2005, para. 23), and while the right-wing wanted Bush to focus exclusively on 
border security (Lochhead, 2005), the center of his party despised mass deportations and largely 
supported some version of a temporary worker program (Economist, 2005, para. 24).   
Clearly, Bush’s speech did not win immediate and overwhelming assent from moderates 
or pro-immigration Democrats, but it did activate anti-immigration Republicans, who now had a 
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clear target against which to campaign, particularly if they wanted to distance themselves from a 
President whose popularity was flagging.  Tom Tancredo, a Republican Congressperson from 
Colorado who was an outspoken advocate of restrictive immigration efforts, was the most visible 
of those who furthered their political careers by running to the right on immigration.  After the 
Tucson address, he warned the right that Republican politicians were “worried about whether or 
not you can really take to the bank” Bush’s dedication to border security (Quijano, 2005, para. 
13).  Leslie Sanchez, the former director of Hispanic communications for the Republican 
National Committee, argued Bush’s proposed solutions increased conservative confusion and 
uncertainty, because his proposals came with “a lot of things that look like immigrant-bashing” 
(Quijano, 2005, para. 15), which alienated moderate Republicans, Hispanics, and women, all of 
whom were key to a successful social movement.  
 Reactions to the speech away from the border echoed the tepid reaction of moderate 
conservatives, with potential followers confused about Bush’s message and potential opponents 
clear about where he stood.  At the border, Bush’s security-focused opponents saw the speech as 
a call for amnesty, with national media regularly quoting Minutemen activists’ response to the 
speech in their reports (Economist, 2005; Fox News, 2005). 
In Washington, big businesses pulled their support of Bush’s plan, a loss that was not 
offset by powerful immigration lobbies, making passage of a comprehensive bill more difficult 
(Lochhead, 2005; Edwards and Herder, 2012).  As various proposals circulated in Congress, 
including House debates about the competing Senate bills co-sponsored by two of the figures on 
stage with Bush at Tucson, the debate moved away from Bush’s framework, prioritizing border 
security with little attention paid to guest workers or paths to citizenship.  
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By the end of the year, the House had passed H.R. 4437, “The border protection, anti-
terrorism and illegal immigration control act of 2005,” which focused on preventing illegal 
immigrants from crossing the border and making obtaining gainful employment more difficult 
for illegals already living in the United States (AP, 2005a, para. 1-2).  The bill was incredibly 
punitive, emphasizing increased punishments for illegal immigrants and those Americans who 
aided illegal immigrants, requiring the construction of 700 miles of border fencing, and 
formalizing Congressional oversight of border security.  As part of negotiations, Congress agreed 
to put off discussion of the guest worker program until early 2006 (AP, 2005a, para. 3).  At this 
point, it was clear that Bush’s effort was facing serious difficulties.  
Between Bush’s Tucson address in November and the Spring Congressional session the 
following year, forces coalesced that radically altered the context of the debate Congress would 
undertake.  The next chapter will look at those forces, including the rapid deployment of the term 
“amnesty” after Bush’s address, and the mobilization of two emerging counter-movements, one 
among conservatives and the other among Hispanics.  Bush’s success in defining immigration 
reform in a way consistent with CIR helped encourage opposition on the right, but failed to earn 
support from the left.  
In spite of Bush’s immediate failure, there is reason to believe that Bush’s local audience 
picked up on Bush’s definition of immigration reform, leading to more complex and 
compassionate explanations of illegal immigration than previously.  Local newspapers and TV 
news spent the rest of 2005 doing in-depth long form journalism covering illegal immigration in 
Arizona communities, and The Daily Star slowly replaced omnipresent stories of criminal 
behavior among immigrants with complex discussion of competing political proposals.  Readers 
responded, and The Daily Star felt compelled to collect and publish those opinions, which were 
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universally supportive of approaches that looked beyond crime.  One reader begged for 
Americans “to discuss issues of importance in a fair, reasoned and civil way” (“Readers sound 
off,” 2006, Shultz).  Another suggested reorienting the debate away from border security, 
because “we are not asking the right question. It shouldn't be ‘how do we stop all these illegal 
immigrants from crossing into our country?’ Maybe we need to ask, ‘why are so many Mexican 
citizens fleeing their country’” (“Readers sound off,” 2006, Alvarez).  For the border 




Chapter Four:  A Rhetoric of Calm Among Cacophony 
After the careful choices that marked George W. Bush’s rhetoric in the inception period, 
the unmitigated vitriol in conservative responses to the issue was loud and blunt.  Conservatives 
screamed on talk radio, mobilized support from the pro-minutemen sections of their base, and 
generally ignored the content of Bush’s appeals.  Moderates saw the vitriol on one side, but no 
equal and opposite passion in Bush’s rhetoric, which gave them little reason to ramp up their 
own participation.  The left were largely ignored in Bush’s early efforts on the assumption that 
their support would eventually materialize if they were given a choice between his approach and 
that of Congressional Republicans, but they failed to make a distinction between partisan 
demagoguery among opinion leaders on the right and Bush’s conciliatory rhetoric, associating 
Bush with Colorado Republican Tom Tancredo, talk radio host Rush Limbaugh, and other 
prominent anti-immigration voices among the cacophony on the right. 
Ignoring George W. Bush’s call to “pass a good bill” (Bush, 2005, para. 38) that included 
provisions for a temporary worker program and a path to citizenship for illegal aliens, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed H.R. 4437 on December 16, 2005.  Also known as the “Border 
Control, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005” or the “Sensenbrenner 
Bill” (Wasem, 2013, “Summary” para. 3), it offered border security provisions without 
addressing a temporary worker program or creating a path to citizenship for immigrants.  The 
House agreed to discuss other provisions after the Senate offered their version of the bill, which 
was expected early the following year.  At that point, Congress adjourned for their winter 
break.  Whether either chamber actually intended to discuss the immigrant-friendly provisions 
when they returned, the political environment in early 2006 looked very different from the one 
they left, and both chambers put further immigration reform discussions on hold indefinitely. 
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The primary reason Congress avoided the topic was the emergence of a conservative 
counter-movement during that winter and spring.  Supporters of the Sensenbrenner bill joined 
Rush Limbaugh’s “crusade” (Resnick, 2013, para. 14) to bully any politician who stepped out of 
line on deportation-only immigration reform, even when listeners did not actually understand the 
bill (Noah, 2014).  Talk radio typically dominated public political conversation among 
conservatives, so much so that Trent Lott complained “talk radio is running America” and that 
his phones were “jammed up for three weeks” (Weisman & Murray, 2007, para. 7) with callers 
directed to Congress by inflammatory, immigrant-bashing talk radio hosts, “no one more so than 
Rush Limbaugh” (Resnick, 2013, para. 14). 
Even a moderate policymaker who felt free to ignore Limbaugh and his colleagues would 
have been unable to ignore the bricks in their offices.  During the push for comprehensive 
immigration reform (CIR), 12,000 bricks were delivered to Capitol Hill in support of a wall 
across the border between the U.S. and Mexico (Hulse, 2006), a visually striking and hard to 
ignore campaign, which was made all the more impressive by the additional security measures 
involving Congressional mail put in place after the 2001 anthrax attacks (Chaddock, 2006).  The 
conservative counter-movement had powerful message distribution networks, organizational 
infrastructure, and deep pockets. Talk radio hosts would get listeners to “melt the Senate phone 
lines” (Lucas, 2013, para. 5) or fill their office with inconveniently cumbersome building 
materials, a threat about as subtle as the figurative brick through a Senator’s window. 
Tom Tancredo, who rose to national prominence during Bush’s push for CIR, seized on 
the potential of mobilized anti-immigration supporters, utilizing right-wing rhetoric to connect 
immigration and terrorism, conflating American anxieties about the issues into a single anti-
terror, anti-immigration narrative.  Tancredo sought credibility as the political leader of an 
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emerging conservative counter-movement, so to win points with his base he repeatedly slammed 
Bush, labeling him as out-of-touch, pro-Democrat, pro-Mexican, anti-American, and anti-
security.  He would later use the attention he garnered as Bush’s most vocal political opponent 
on the right as the basis for a 2008 presidential campaign, demonstrating the political potential 
on the right that could be available to leaders who effectively associated themselves with grass-
roots immigration movements. 
At the same time, a primarily Latino pro-immigration grassroots counter-movement also 
saw Bush as an enemy and took to the streets in large numbers to demonstrate against the anti-
immigration efforts in Washington. The demonstrations began in earnest during March, when 
thousands of protesters marched in Chicago (Avila & Olivo, 2006), followed by similar marches 
in large urban areas for the next several weeks, culminating on May 1st, with a series of rallies 
known alternately as the “Great American Boycott,” “Dia Sin Imigrantes” [“Day Without 
Immigrants”] protests, or “May Day Protests,” in which “more than a million demonstrators took 
to the streets” (Glaister & MacAskill, 2006) of more than 50 U.S. cities, chanting “Si, se puede” 
[“Yes, we can”] making the protests one of the largest in U.S. history. 
Many members of Congress who had voted against the Sensenbrenner bill suffered the 
wrath of organized Conservatives and felt heat from groups back home as well (Turque & 
Stewart, 2006; Watanabe & Becerra, 2006).  With so much opposition, it should come as no 
surprise that the Senate Judiciary Committee was in no rush to move the bill to the floor.  Armed 
with a variety of procedural rules, they could forestall discussion of Arlen Specter’s bill 
(Congress.gov, “S.2611”) seemingly forever, avoiding the inevitable political backlash from 
choosing a side.  
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 Seemingly alone amidst a cacophony of shouting voices, Bush renewed his efforts to 
generate support for CIR with a speech in Irvine, California on April 24, 2006.  The speech was 
divided into three broad sections, with the first devoted to the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the 
War on Terror, the second covering immigration reform, and the third comprised of a question-
and-answer session on general topics, most of which Bush tried to relate back to immigration 
reform.  Like the Tucson address, Bush’s speech in Irvine received limited national attention, but 
border community residents and other individuals interested in immigration reform from either 
end of the political spectrum paid close attention, as evidenced by the large amount of coverage 
by local news from around the border, conservative talk-radio, and online message boards 
catering to conservative and Latinos’ political interests.    
Following the speech, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to move the bill to floor 
debate, a surprise victory for Bush at a moment he desperately needed one. On May 15th, less 
than three weeks after the Irvine speech and the day the Senate began debate over their version 
of CIR, Bush delivered a nationally-televised White House address on Immigration reform, the 
first of its kind.  
The May 15th address was the first time many Americans heard Bush speak at length 
about immigration.  He wasn’t giving an address in a border community for local 
audiences.  This time he was in the White House, carried live during prime time by all of the 
major networks.  To those new viewers, Bush offered a clear five-point outline of his CIR 





The purposes that must be achieved in the crisis stage of a social movement are less 
defined than the purposes of the inception stage, but the ultimate goal is to achieve the 
movement objective, in this case the passage of CIR.  One particular problem common to the 
crisis stage is the difficulty movements have when competing with powerful counter-
movements.  When dealing with this problem, institutional movements generally have a choice 
between three options: oppose counter-movements, ignore them, or co-opt them. 
For Bush, he had to oppose, ignore, or co-opt two different movements, one from the 
right and one from the left, which made his task more difficult.  He could not use the same 
strategy on both counter-movements, because they were opposed to each other.  If he attempted 
to co-opt one counter-movement, then it would serve as opposition to the other, further 
foreclosing his options, and if he chose to ignore both, he would remain in the middle, facing 
opposition on two fronts, making it difficult to generate support from the public.  Bush had to 
choose how he would position himself relative to each movement, and to do so a primary 
purpose in the crisis stage was to encourage reasonable conversation and rational debate, moving 
conversation towards the rational middle ground. 
Bush also had purposes from the inception stage that he had not fulfilled, a burden that he 
carried into the crisis stage.  Most notably, he had failed to effectively distinguish his middle 
path from more extreme options in the eyes of his opposition, a problem exacerbated by his 
inability to establish himself as the credible leader of a movement that could effect change.  For 
security hawks on the right, Bush was peddling amnesty, offering an automatic path to 
citizenship for lawbreakers that would only encourage more illegal immigration and undermine 
American laws.  For immigration-friendly liberals, moderates, and Latinos, Bush was another 
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voice in the cacophony of nativist Republicans who wanted mass deportations and hid his 
sinister intentions behind the thin justification of security.  If Bush wanted to effect change, he 
needed to build enough personal credibility with at least one of those blocs that he would be 
recognized as a leader deserving passionate support. 
Finally, Bush needed to find a balanced approach that would appease Democrats enough 
to get the Senate bill to the floor for a vote, while also mollifying the Republican-controlled 
House of Representatives.  Bush’s primary target was the right in the hope that they might be 
persuaded to work with Bush.  In his mind, delivering the right to the negotiating table was the 
key to passing a bill. 
While Bush wanted public support to pressure Congress, he also needed to stop the slide 
in his conservative approval in order to aid potential allies who were facing primary challengers 
from the right.  Moderate Republicans often wanted to support the president on immigration 
reform (“Immigration Reform Proposals,” 2006), but desperately needed political cover to do so 
(Swarns, 2006).  Congressional districts that had been gerrymandered following the 2000 
election (Greenhouse, 2005) left many Republicans more fearful of competition from the right in 
primaries than the left in general elections, which made it more difficult for some Republicans to 
support CIR.  With Bush’s approval ratings at their nadir among the Republicans in general and 
on the issue of immigration reform specifically, Bush could not offer his supporters political 
cover by lending them his name or by promising to campaign alongside embattled 
representatives in their home districts.  In this difficult situation, Bush began his efforts to 




Strategic Patterns in Bush’s Irvine Address 
In the April 24th address in Irvine, George W. Bush used the same basic strategic pattern 
he had used in Tucson, creating a cognitive schema for his audience based on their previous 
knowledge and using it to explain immigration reform in relation to the war on terror.  Bush 
continued to characterize the problems of illegal immigration as a violation of American values, 
with Democrat-friendly proposals tied to the compassion and Republican-friendly proposals tied 
to the rule of law.  
Also similar to the Tucson address, Bush characterized himself as heroic, but in Irvine 
that heroism drew directly from his role as Commander-In-Chief.  While the Tucson speech 
directly associated Bush with the Border Patrol, in the Irvine address Bush created a pair of 
associative triangles, first on a domestic level between himself, U.S. soldiers, and the Border 
Patrol, and second on an international level between himself, other world leaders, and the armed 
forces as an aspect of his agency.  
While some strategic patterns in Irvine were similar to those of the inception stage, the 
speech reflected deeper changes in Bush’s rhetorical strategy more than a simple evolution of his 
previous efforts.  Locality and personal experience were no longer the primary way for audiences 
to understand the world, because the world Bush discussed was global, interconnected, and 
populated with powerful agents.  Security was no longer primarily a matter of preventing crime, 
because the immigration section of the speech was overshadowed by the section on terrorism, a 
far greater security concern.  While the Tucson speech spent only a few paragraphs explicitly 
praising immigrants for enacting American values, the bulk of the Irvine address’ discussion of 
immigrants did so.  
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Generally, the new direction in Bush’s rhetoric responded to the extreme nature of 
immigration rhetoric at the time.  Discussing terror allowed him to demonstrate his strengths 
with conseratives, but he tempered that with more personal discussion of immigrants that showed 
his dedication to the provisions supported by the left.  Bush’s response to the partisanship on 
immigration reform was an attempt to build a pragmatic rhetoric of the middle ground, calling 
for rational argument in public discussion.   
Conflict scenarios.  When discussing terrorism throughout his presidency, Bush often 
described a world populated by agents of evil intent on doing harm to innocent people, generally 
falling into one of two perspectives.  The first, which many critics argue prevents rational debate 
(Domke, 2004; Condit, 2010), was built around a Manichean frame in which heroic Americans 
opposed evil terrorists by any means necessary, allowing the president to label any opponents 
with whom he disagreed as evil and inhuman, thus rendering their ideas unworthy of 
consideration.  In the Irvine address, Bush employed a less frequently used variant of his anti-
terror rhetoric, in which a third party entered the scene.  Terrorists hurt more than innocent 
Americans, also hurting Arab Muslims by perverting Islam, a move that recognized difference 
and ecouraged compassion.  “We face an enemy that had no regard for innocent life, an enemy 
which has hijacked a great religion to suit their political needs” (para. 8), Bush argued, 
maintaining the good vs. evil dynamic, but explicitly incorporating an extra party within his 
notion of moral correctness.  Understanding the humanity of the third actor was “the first lesson 
of September 11th, 2001” (para. 8), suggesting that Bush wanted Americans to use that simple 
frame to understand conflicts, a schema he would return to as he discussed immigration.  
Bush had tried a simple schema based around criminal conflict in Tucson, although some 
aspects were too subtle for many in his audience to accept.  The schema based around terrorist 
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conflict had no such problems with subtlety.  Bush placed terrorism at the forefront of problems 
facing the country, so the threat would not be overlooked, arguing “the confluence of a terrorist 
network with weapons of mass destruction is the biggest threat the United States of America 
faces” (para. 12).  Rather than move through various levels of locality, removing blame by 
implicit dissociations between immigrants and coyotes, Bush directly related roles in the conflict 
surrounding illegal immigration to roles in the conflict surrounding the war on terror, a much 
simpler leap for his audience to make. 
One area in which Bush was far too subtle in Tucson was when he attempted to separate 
immigrants from coyotes.  His Irvine address focused on being direct and forthright about the 
difference between the two groups.  As he turned to immigration, he made the distinction 
between illegal immigrants and coyotes much clearer than he did in Tucson by following the 
same model he used when discussing terror by explicitly separating the actions of immigrants 
from those of vicious human smugglers.  In order to understand this shift, it is important to 
consider the strategies Bush employed in the section on terror.  When he discussed terrorism and 
its victims, he did so by placing Iraqi desires within a universal framework based on God.  “I 
believe there’s an Almighty,” Bush explained, “one of the great gifts of the Almighty is the 
desire in everybody’s soul…to be free.  I believe liberty is universal.  I believe people want to be 
free” (para. 17).  Iraqis enjoyed the gifts of the Almighty as they enacted American values by 
voting (para. 18), praising American troops, and eschewing sectarian violence (para. 
20).  Immigrants were similarly enjoying the Lord’s providence by enacting American values 
within the framework of a higher power.  America was “a nation of immigrants” with “a grand 
tradition…of welcoming people” because “immigration has helped reinvigorate the soul of 
America” (para. 26).  Immigrants courageously sought a better life, often risking their lives to 
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escape their home countries (para. 34).  Newly arrived people worked hard at jobs Americans 
would not do (para. 33, 34, 35), making Americans wealthier (para. 33), while feeding their 
families in the United States or back at home (para. 31).  Immigrants’ efforts in America made 
“America a better place” (para. 26), and did so without hurting Americans.  These appeals ought 
to have been included in Tucson, but were overlooked in favor of subtler strategies, perhaps in 
the hopes of distancing himself from some of the pro-immigrant rhetoric of his first term. 
The simplest marker of the three-party variant of Bush’s perspective is that he explicitly 
used the term “coyotes” during the Irvine address for the first time in his push for immigration 
reform (para. 34).  Bush defined coyotes as “smugglers” who were “preying on innocent life” 
(para. 34), making the distinction between human traffickers and immigrants plain. Americans, 
whether they were small business owners or Border Patrol agents, were constantly victimized by 
coyotes, who ran “an underground industry [that] thrives on human beings” (para. 35).  Even 
when illegal immigrants appeared to be violating American values, Bush excused them, arguing 
that when individuals disappeared from catch-and-release programs, they failed to show up for 
their court dates because “they were coming to work, see.  They wanted to put food on the table 
for their families, and they weren’t interested in checking back in” (para. 30).  Finally, Bush 
made the priorities of all freedom-loving people clear, insisting that Americans wanted the 
Border Patrol “chasing smugglers and dope runners” (para. 36), rather than breaking up hard-
working families. 
Mollifying the right.  Throughout his presidency, Bush had been too moderate for 
conservatives’ tastes on immigration.  Unwilling to surrender the potential support of the right, 
which was crucial to getting any policy through Congress, Bush repeated many of his appeals to 
conservatives, while adding others. Again, he drew credibility on the issue from being a border 
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governor (para. 27) and from increasing funding, technology, and manpower on the border (para. 
27).  Bush also repeated his vow to end catch and release programs (Paras. 30, 31) and increase 
interior worksite enforcement (32-34), using many of the same statistics, citing the same 
programs, and employing the same types of appeals as he had earlier in his push for CIR. 
Bush tried to distance himself from the amnesty label, refusing to use the word at all in 
the Irvine speech.  If his articulation of the difference between coyotes and illegal immigrants 
was made more explicit in Irvine, then the absence of “amnesty” is doubly fascinating.  In 
Tucson, his limited use of the word forced media outlets to only use the sound bite he wanted, 
but the very presence of the word granted those news reports the justification for covering 
amnesty, often by quoting other policy makers, taking control of the story away from Bush.  This 
allowed Tom Tancredo and his ilk to define amnesty any way they wanted.  In the Irvine 
address, the absence of the term may have been a plan to get news reports to avoid using the 
word entirely.  
Bush also distanced himself from amnesty by more clearly articulating his proposal and 
by passing the details off to Congress, so he could stay on message as a security-focused leader 
who opposed amnesty. He offered no reservations when rejecting an automatic path to 
citizenship, calling the idea unfair to Americans, unfair to those who made the effort to enter the 
country legally, and a violation of the principle of law and order (para. 42). His proposal let 
immigrants demonstrate the worthiness of their claim to citizenship through working in the 
United States, demonstrating their economic value to the country, learning American customs, 
values, and the English language, and getting “in the back of the line” (para. 43), which he 
claimed upheld the rule of law.  Outside of those general principles, on which all of the potential 
bills in Congress that included a temporary worker provision agreed, Bush elided specifics, 
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asking Congress to provide the details of a path to citizenship in terms of how long an individual 
needed to be in the country before they were earned citizenship and what nationalities were 
allowed in (para. 39, 43). 
Pragmatic rationality.  While Bush stressed his security bona fides with the right by 
reinforcing the security aspect of his proposal and couching immigration within the war on 
terror, he also distanced himself from the most punitive approach to immigration favored by 
Tancredo or Sensenbrenner, positioning his reform proposal as the only alternative to mass 
deportations.  Massive deportations were “unrealistic,” and “just not going to work” (para. 39), 
and those that supported them were distracted by their emotions.  In contrast to those on the right 
who were loud and emotional, Bush was able to rise above petty political squabbling.  Bush had 
a plan that would “dismantle” this network of coyotes and provide cheap labor to American 
businesses, without the need for mass deportations, through “rational policy” (para. 38).  
Throughout the speech, he followed that pattern, promising security the right could get 
behind, while calling for rational policy.  When discussing the Border Patrol, for example, he 
told his audience “the best way to enforce our border … is to come up with a rational plan that 
recognizes people coming here to work and let them do so on a temporary basis” (para. 
35).  When he discussed a temporary worker program, he argued for “a rational, temporary 
worker plan that says you don't need to sneak across the border… so you don't have to pay 
money to a coyote that stuffs you in the back of a truck” (para. 37).  His calls for rationality 
therefore supported liberal proposals that allowed for immigrants to stay in the United 
States.  Bush’s rationality was based on recognizing immigrants’ inherent humanity, which 
punitive proposals implicitly denied.  Rational people, in Bush’s view, wanted “our Border 
Patrol hunting gun smugglers and dope runners” (para. 37), because they understood the 
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difference between coyotes and immigrants. Rational Americans wanted “to treat people with 
respect” (Para, 38), and would oppose vicious, human-smuggling coyotes without breaking up 
honest, hard-working families. 
For non-conservatives, Bush had to overcome the perception that he was part of the far 
right and equally responsible for the screaming matches that had dominated the national 
conversations for months.  To do so, he associated himself loosely with the conservative 
establishment, before calling for change, a semi-apology that marked a new start, separated him 
from the perception that he was too conservative, and offered a form of enactment that 
conservatives could model. He argued that Americans had been failed by “those of us in 
positions of responsibility” (para. 38) and “those of us who have microphones” (para. 26), led 
astray from recognizing the humanity of immigrants by powerful opinion leaders in talk-radio 
and Washington.  By associating himself with the old movement and calling for change, he could 
try to create separation from conservatives as he moved forward, as if his rhetoric had changed.   
Bush criticized the emotional outbursts that characterized both sides of the debate, but 
only called for border security hawks side to debate more rationally.  Bush assured his audience 
that he understood that immigration had been “an emotional debate” (para. 38), but insisted “one 
thing we cannot lose sight of is that we're talking about human beings, decent human beings that 
need to be treated with respect” (para. 38), an appeal that could only be aimed at conservatives 
who had been ignoring immigrants’ humanity.  It would have been simple to call for orderly 
discussions and the rule of law, decrying the disruption Latino demonstrations had in major 
American cities, but the speech offered no evidence that he wanted pro-immigrant 




Bush called on American values to prime his audience to think about immigrants through 
a welcoming frame.  Discussion had to proceed “in a respectful way that recognizes we are a 
nation of immigrants” (para. 26), because America had always been a “nation of law, a 
welcoming nation, a nation that honors people's traditions no matter where they're from because 
we've got confidence in the capacity of our nation to make us all Americans, one nation under 
God” (para. 44).  “Ours is a society”(para. 26), Bush reminded his audience, “that is able to take 
the newly arrived, and they become equally American” (para. 26).  Immigrants who strived to be 
part of the country because they had a dream, and as long as they were “willing to work hard for 
that dream, it makes America a better place” (para. 26). 
Even before discussing immigration, Bush primed his audience toward accepting 
immigrants as American by explaining that rational thought was the key to defeating terrorists, 
who hated America.  Americans who wanted security both on the border and in Iraq needed “to 
be able to connect the concept of freedom to our security” (para. 22), and he explained the 
connection for them.  Terrorists exploited American compassion and fear, through their 
“willingness and capacity to kill innocent people” (para. 13).  American values were “the best 
way to defeat the enemy, the best way to defeat their ability to exploit hopelessness and despair” 
through the rational principle of “a chance to live in a free society” (para. 17).   
Freedom was the uniting force binding disparate people together in God’s eyes, because 
the Almighty offered freedom (para. 12), and if his audience believed that “liberty exists in the 
soul of each person on the face of the Earth,” then it shouldn't surprise them “people will say, we 
want to be free” (para. 18).  Bush used the connection between freedom and recognizing the 
humanity of others by bridging the terrorism section and the immigration section of his speech 
with a narrative of the connection between Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan and George H.W. 
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Bush, the President’s father. “We talk about issues of peace,” Bush said of his conversations with 
his Japanese counterpart, “I find it so interesting and so ironic that those are the conversations I 
have with him, especially since 60 years ago, my dad… fought the Japanese as an enemy” (para. 
22).  The two warring families were able to come together because “Japan adopted a Japanese-
style democracy. Democracy can help change the world and lay the foundation for peace” (para. 
23). 
Bush called for calm, reasonable rhetoric and a rational middle ground in which to have a 
civil debate.  Those calls were aimed to get the border security hawks within the President’s 
party to compromise, and he coupled them with security rhetoric and references to Iraq that were 
designed to mollify those far right elements that had caused him so many problems.  He used the 
God terms they held most dearly, including freedom, democracy, and the Almighty, proving he 
spoke their language and shared their values, but if this strategy was going to work, he also 
needed to deliver a consistent and concise message in the question-and-answer session, so that he 
could relate any concerns that remained with his audience to the ideological world he created in 
the body of his speech. 
Questions and Answers 
Bush had worked hard to move his rhetoric to the right while also undercutting the 
rhetoric of those even farther to the right.  Importantly, he had found a way to move that 
direction while maintaining the inherent value of immigrants.  When he was forced off-script 
during the question and answer session, however, the middle ground he articulated was lost. 
He took eight questions from the audience, four of which dealt with various aspects of 
immigration reform.  In these answers, Bush accepted the premise of the questions that assumed 
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immigrants were dangerous and failed to articulate how his program would improve American 
life.  His performance was far from clear, concise, and consistent.  
The first question was about Bush’s regrets while in office, and in an ironic twist he 
would later say was his biggest regret while in office was his failure to pass CIR.  At the time, he 
made the case that he was right to go to war in Iraq and that the situation on the ground could not 
have been fully understood during invasion planning.  As he described the chaos and loss of 
American life in the prolonged military effort in Iraq, he contradicted his earlier case that Iraq 
was a model of rationality, democracy, and freedom.  Stammering through his explanation of the 
problems in Iraq, his response raised questions about whether his immigration plan would unfold 
any better than the invasion of Iraq.   
        If the question about his regrets was a hanging pitch, he failed to swing at all when a 14-
year-old asked what the country would look like in the future.  As he discussed an idyllic 
American future, Bush never mentioned the first generation of newly-minted Americans, the 
financial success of small-business owners who had hired temporary immigrant labor, or any 
issue of concern to immigrants or Latinos.  By failing to pivot from the questions back to 
immigration, he missed opportunities to demonstrate that his plan could meet the needs of his 
audience. 
Even worse were his answers to the questions directly concerning immigration.  When a 
worried mother of an injured 12-year-old girl asked if immigrants were the reason emergency 
room care was slow, he interrupted her question in order to concede the point, as if immigrants 
so obviously prevented medical care for children that the question was an annoyance (Question 
3, para. 2).  When local policymakers insisted Bush’s program had not made it to Orange 
County, Bush dismissed them and blamed the poor ER treatment the adolescent girl received on 
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her mother’s ignorance, saying of the local health centers his bill provided “I'm surprised you 
don't have one here. I bet you do, and you just don't know it” (Question 3, para. 5). 
He used a subsequent question as an opportunity to insist that a legal immigrant from 
Cuba would not be allowed to visit the country of his birth under a CIR program, then used 
another response to deny having known any immigrants growing up in Midland, Texas, an 
unbelievable claim that he would later dispute in his memoir.  He missed multiple opportunities 
to make immigration more personal or praise new Americans, preferring technical discussion of 
Fidel Castro’s currency policy and reminding his audience that previous members of his 
administration had been fired for hiring illegal workers. 
The only time Bush managed to steer a question back to CIR without contradicting or 
subverting his speech was the final question, which asked the President what supporters of his 
specific version of CIR policy could do to make sure it became law.  His response, “talking 
about it in a candid way” (Question 8, para. 14) did not involve calling individual representatives 
or joining demonstrations, but at least it didn’t directly contradict his earlier statements.  What 
followed, however, was a stammering, incoherent mess.  He began by describing “The state of 
play right now” (Question 8, para. 15), as an environment in which “the Senate reached an 
important compromise” at the same time the Senate paradoxically “had a chance to get a bill, it 
just got caught up in, in my judgment, needless politics” (Question 8, para. 15).  Politics was 
“one of the problems we face in Washington” because “we got people who aren't willing to -- 
they want to play -- they want to make the other person look bad, as opposed to make the country 
look good” (Question 8, para. 15).  Bush’s solution was asking “people, whether it be on Social 
Security reform, or immigration reform, to think about the country first, and put our political 
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parties aside” (Question 8, para. 15).  Immigration was confusing to moderates, and Bush had 
failed to make it personal for his audience, even when given a perfect opportunity. 
        George W. Bush’s April 24th, 2006 address in Irvine further developed the rhetorical 
strategies from the inception stage, associating the conflict scenarios of his earlier rhetoric with 
the success conservatives perceived in Iraq.  In a new direction for his rhetoric, he drew explicit 
distinctions between immigrants and coyotes and greatly increased the number and strength of 
his associations between immigrants and American values.  He used a strategy of calling for 
rational debate to eliminate competing perspectives from the debate.  Then, before he had even 
left the stage, he lost the thread of his thesis in the question and answer session, badly misfiring 
on some topics while completely ignoring the potential of others.   
Reactions to the Irvine Address 
Media coverage of Bush’s Irvine address reflected the confusion and ambivalence of the 
speech itself.  Terrorism and the war in Iraq dominated news coverage of the speech, particularly 
Bush’s question and answer response regarding his failure to plan well enough in Iraq (Brubaker, 
2006) with far less coverage devoted to immigration.  NBC (“Bush Diverting Oil Reserves,” 
2006) pulled a quotation from the question and answer session in which Bush discussed energy 
independence, focusing their coverage of Bush’s immigration speech on gas prices.  Others 
repeated his insistence that mass deportation was “unrealistic” (Loven, 2006), in conjunction 
with his support of community health centers, opting to cover Bush’s concession that immigrants 
take up hospital space but was unwilling to deport those who stood in the way of Americans 
receiving hospital treatment. 
Still, some news coverage picked up on the humanitarian aspects of Bush’s message, as 
coverage of immigration protests increasingly discussed the personal stories of individual 
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immigrants along with quotes from the President about their humanity (Kalita, 2006; Archibold, 
2006). Moreover, editorial content in major newspapers better reflected the distinctions between 
Bush’s proposals and those of other Republicans, often associating Bush with Ted Kennedy, 
Arlen Specter, and Senate Democrats, instead of Tom Tancredo and Congressional 
Republicans.  NPR ran a feature discussing the language of the immigration debate, in which 
Otto Santa Ana gushed about the President’s immigration rhetoric, recounting the first time he 
heard Bush talk about immigration, when he “was so shocked I had to stop, get off the freeway, 
and listen to it…I was overwhelmed” (Schmitz, 2006, para. 25). 
Support for immigration reform among average Americans remained largely unchanged 
(Segovia & Defever, 2010; Muste, 2013), but Americans were increasingly against mass 
deportations (“Immigration Bill Stalls in Senate,” 2006), a sign that Bush was moving the 
conversation away from one fringe.  Confusingly, 7 out of 10 Americans favored temporary 
worker status, while 8 out of 10 Americans in the same poll opposed amnesty (Blanton, 2006), in 
spite of the fact that security hawks often labeled a temporary worker program as amnesty.  This 
disjunction reflected a baffled public and highlighted the work still to be done by the Bush 
administration.  Support for Bush’s immigration proposal also did not translate to support for his 
handling of immigration, which remained at a dismal 25%, slightly below his overall approval 
ratings of 31%, record lows for both (Nagourney & Thee, 2006; “Public disillusionment,” 
2006).  If Bush’s unpopularity had a silver lining, it was found in a Pew poll that showed that 
even Bush’s atrocious approval rating was better than the average rating respondents gave for the 
Congressional representative from their home district (“Public Disillusionment,” 2006). 
One positive result for Bush was that Tom Tancredo did back off of his calls for mass 
deportations for the next few weeks (Loven, 2006, para. 5), possibly giving Bush’s 
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Congressional allies a window in which to act.  Outside Congress, the President had less success 
in bringing conservative opinion leaders into the rational middle ground.  Rush Limbaugh 
continued to hammer the President’s immigration plan, telling his radio audience the day after 
the Irvine address “the one place the president doesn't appear to be flexible at all is when it 
comes to immigration,” before asking his listeners to redouble their efforts, because the Bush 
administration “don't hear you on immigration” (Limbaugh, 2006a, para. 10).    
Shockingly, among the chaos and ambivalence of American reactions to Bush’s rhetoric, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee surprised Beltway insiders by moving immigration reform out of 
committee for floor debates on the way to a possible vote.  The Bush administration seized on 
this sudden success, and scheduled a prime time television address for May 15th, the first day of 
immigration debates in the Senate.  Buoyed by an unexpected opportunity to move immigration 
reform forward and tempered by prior failures, Bush prepared to give a speech to garner support. 
Strategic Patterns in Bush’s Oval Office Address 
Bush’s May 15th speech was the first time a president had focused an Oval Office 
address on illegal immigration and it would be the only Oval Office address during his tenure 
that did not deal with terrorism or the war in Iraq (AP, 2010; American Presidency Project, 2015; 
Calmes, 2013; Bush White House Archive).  By giving an Oval Office address on immigration 
reform, Bush acknowledged that the stakes were incredibly high.  However, the speech was 
much shorter than his other major immigration addresses, due to the constraints of network 
primetime.  With an address half the length of “The Future of Immigration Refom” in Tucson, or 
the Irvine “Immigration Reform: Address in California,” the strategic patterns Bush employed in 
the Oval Office were much simpler than elsewhere in his push for immigration reform. 
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As a result of the time constraints, Bush jettisoned the strategy of creating a cognitive 
schema he could mobilize across a variety of dimensions to make far-flung associations more 
concrete for his audience.  To make his proposal as clear as possible, Bush laid out his speech 
around a detailed account of each point of his plan.  The five points in his proposal comprise 15 
of the 23 paragraphs in the text of the speech, with the remainder dedicated to outlining the 
problem to which his reform proposal responded, the actions he wanted each chamber of 
Congress to take, and how typical Americans could help.  With a few very notable exceptions, 
little of the political substance had changed in the course of the previous 10 months; Bush still 
put border security first, represented by a combination of manpower and technology along the 
border coupled with better worksite enforcement infrastructure, and his security appeals 
represented the bulk of the speech (para. 6-15). He also argued for a temporary worker program 
(Para 16, 17) and better interior enforcement (para. 18), as he had in every speech.  He explained 
how his temporary worker program was not amnesty (para. 19), and called on Americans to 
respect individual immigrants at the same time he called on immigrants to assimilate (para. 20), 
again similar to previous addresses on the topic. 
Security, security, security.  At the opening of the speech, Bush stated his purpose, 
which was to “make it clear where I stand, and where I want to lead the country on a vital issue” 
(para. 2), articulating that his purpose was clarity about his position and how that related to 
policy.  What Bush made clear in this speech was that immigration was a matter of security, 
thereby jettisoning many of the rhetorical strategies of his previous efforts.  As I note later, to 
make his commitment to border security clear, he promised a surge of 6,000 National Guard 
troops to the border.  Bush was addressing the right as well as he could, hoping that by 
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mollifying security hawks with overwhelming military commitment, it would help a 
comprehensive bill pass the Senate.  
In this effort, he explained that American values were best represented by a border that 
was “secure, orderly, and fair” (para. 5), three words that he had only associated with border 
security and his opposition to amnesty previously, and which he consistently referred to in terms 
of orderly placement in the green card line and fairness to those in the country legally.   
        Even the distinction between immigrants and coyotes, so carefully articulated in previous 
speeches, was sacrificed in the name of security. While the difference between coyotes and 
illegal immigrants was made implicitly in Tucson and those distinctions were drawn explicitly in 
Irvine, in the Oval Office address Bush described a border policy in which illegal immigrants 
were the same as coyotes and terrorists: “The border should be open to trade and lawful 
immigration – and shut to illegal immigrants, as well as criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists,” 
adding that doing so was “a basic responsibility of a sovereign nation” (para. 6).  
In the Oval Office, Bush repeated his position that immigrants could enact American 
values by passing through the legal system his proposal set up.  Immigrants would have to find a 
willing employer and would have to leave the country at the end of their visa or when the 
employer no longer needed their labor.  While in his previous addresses, he used the inherent 
value of humanity or the providence of the Almighty to justify the presence of immigrants in his 
proposal, he now advocated a criminal background check as part of his visa program, forcing 
immigrants to provide evidence that they shared American values before they would be allowed 
to work or assimilate.  As a country, Mexico was “our neighbor and our friend” (para. 12), but 
needed to cooperate with the United States “to improve security on both sides of the border, to 
confront common problems like drug trafficking and crime, and to reduce illegal immigration” 
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(para. 12).  A temporary worker program was described as part of the homeland security 
apparatus because the primary purpose of work visas was easing the “enormous pressure on our 
border that walls and patrols alone will not stop.  To secure the border effectively, we must 
reduce the numbers of people trying to sneak across” (para. 16).  “Above all” (para. 18), the 
purpose of temporary work visas was to “add to our security by making certain we know who is 
in our country and why they are here” (para. 18). 
For the right, Bush once again drew credibility from being a border-state governor, which 
granted Bush special knowledge into “how difficult it is to enforce the border, and how 
important” border security was to Americans (para. 7).  He also drew credibility from the Border 
Patrol by laying out what he had given the agency.  As the final connection between his 
commitment to border security and providing the Border Patrol with whatever they needed, he 
committed another 6,000 Border Patrol agents over the next 18 months, more than doubling the 
size of the Border Patrol since he took office, a significant increase in manpower.  For the first 
time, he promised “high-tech fences in urban corridors” (para. 9), outfitted with an array of fancy 
electronics, because “America has the best technology in the world – and we will ensure that the 
Border Patrol has the technology they need to do their job and secure the border” (para. 
9).  Finally, Bush authorized 6,000 National Guard troops to be deployed to the southern border 
(para. 9). 
It was an all-in strategy relative to his previous efforts.  Bush scrapped the complicated 
schemas and scenarios from earlier speeches and moved much farther to the right, alienating his 
most vocal pro-immigration supporters.  He had played his trump card, diverting military 
resources from the war on terror to control the border, and there was little else he could do to 
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mollify the right.  Consequently, if he could not get conservative support after this speech, CIR 
policy might be dead in the water.   
The speech also included appeals to moderates and an attempt to attract public 
support.  To do so, Bush argued for rational policy and called on Americans to respect the 
humanity of illegal immigrants.  Bush explained that the reason for his rare prime time 
appearance was “a matter of national importance” (para. 1), warning that “intense emotions” had 
taken control of the immigration debate.  As important as security problems might be, Bush 
connected immigrants’ values and experiences to American ones, urging his audience to 
“remember that the vast majority of illegal immigrants are decent people that work hard, support 
their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives” (para. 4), rather than criminals. 
While he discussed rationality in a similar fashion to his earlier speeches, the explicit 
inclusion of pro-immigrant forces in the irrational, overly emotional group was a new 
development.  When Bush moved his remaining chips to the right side of the table by deploying 
the National Guard to the Rio Grande, he could no longer wait for a pro-immigration movement 
to change opinion.  He argued that his approach was the only “rational middle ground” (para. 19) 
to deportations on the right or unchecked amnesty on the left, and that “wise and realistic” (para. 
19) policy could “honor the great American tradition of the melting pot” (para. 20) at the same 
time it secured the border. 
Having carved out what he hoped was an appealing middle ground, marked his position 
as the only rational plan that was free from blind emotion, and discounted the efforts of counter-
movements on either side, he turned to lawmakers, looking to bring the movement to 
consummation.  “I want to speak directly to members of the House and Senate” he told the 
American people, implying that average Americans should support an immigration reform bill 
89 
 
that is “comprehensive, because all of the elements of this problem must be addressed together or 
none of them will be solved at all” (para. 21).  The House had a bill, and Bush told his audience 
that the Senate should have one by the end of the month so that he could sign the legislation into 
law.  His message was clear: call your elected officials, get a rational debate going, and I will 
solve the problem.  
In the crisis stage, Bush was forced to change his approach from the inception stage, 
making overt many of the arguments he had preferred to leave implicit previously.  If he had 
hoped to sneak in pro-immigration messages without the right overreacting, he had failed, and as 
a result, his crisis stage rhetoric was forced to move to the right at the same time he more clearly 
articulated what he wanted for the left.  His Irvine address was potentially confusing as he tried 
to walk the line between the extremes, even though his calls for rationality were designed to give 
him space in the middle.  Unfortunately, whatever success he might have had at the time was 
undercut by his performance in the question and answer session, and when he addressed the 
nation from the Oval Office, he did so without a single successful address as a blueprint, which 
contributed to the constraints he felt as he spoke in a very limited time slot.  By the end of the 
stage, his rhetoric was focused almost entirely on security and avoided rhetorical flourishes that 
might distract or confuse his audience.  
Reactions to the Oval Office Address 
“The headline news” (Bumiller, 2006b, para. 1) that media picked up from Bush’s Oval 
Office address was the deployment of the National Guard to the southern border.  At the same 
time, many news reports supplemented their coverage of military action with in-depth coverage 
of the liberal provisions in Bush’s policy, including temporary worker programs (“Bush Calls for 
Troops,” 2006; Bumiller, 2006b; Rutenberg, 2006).  Finally, Bush had the public focused on the 
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need for rational discussion.  Moving forward, he needed to maintain that attention and convert it 
into vocal support. 
Liberals mocked the militarization of the border, reminding Bush “the immigrants now 
coming across the Mexican border do not want to sack our cities…they just want to mow our 
lawns and clean our offices” (Tierney, 2006, para. 19).  Many on the left decried Bush’s 
domestic adventurism, comparing the unilateral deployment of  “military boots in the desert 
sand” (“Border Illusions,” 2006, para. 2) on the Southwest border to boots in the Iraqi sand that 
had yet to return.  
At the same time, angering the left with a symbolic gesture might have counted as a 
success, because “symbolism is what’s needed” (Tierney, 2006, para. 4) to provide “the cover 
needed by Republicans to vote for sensible reforms” (Tierney, 2006, para. 3).  Deploying troops 
was “an effort to placate conservatives” (Bumiller, 2006b, para. 2), which largely succeeded at 
calming “conservatives who have demanded concrete steps to stem the flow of illegal workers 
across the border” (Rutenberg, 2006, para. 3).   
Some pro-immigration reform voices remained supportive of Bush, even as his rhetoric 
swung wildly to the right. For long-time followers of Bush’s efforts, Bush’s troop deployment 
“reflected the approach of a man shaped by Texas border-state politics” (Busmiller, 2006b, para. 
1) and “the real theme” of the speech was the need for Congress to “find a middle ground” 
(Bumiller, 2006b, para. 3).  
Bush’s appeals for calm were mixed with calls for increased militarization of the border, 
and he followed the speech with an aggressive and comprehensive media blitz (Hulse & 
Rutenberg, 2006) to bolster both sets of appeals.  For the security hawks, he made a surprise call 
for increased border fencing while riding in a Border Patrol dune buggy (Bumiller, 2006c), 
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drafted a public letter to Congress requesting 6,000 National Guard troops to reinforce the 
border, and made minor speeches and staged appearances throughout the west and midwest that 
focused on security (Stolberg, 2006a).  In support of rational conversation, he enlisted Vice-
President Dick Cheney to defend Bush’s policy on Rush Limbaugh’s syndicated radio program 
(Limbaugh, 2006) and appeared in live interviews on each of the major networks, preaching 
calm in each appearance.  
In the Oval Office address, Bush urged immediate action, and the subsequent media blitz 
demonstrated the urgency he wanted from Congress. He hoped that his energy and urgency could 
translate into leadership, which resonated with Senate Democrats.  Arlen Specter, the author of 
the Senate Bill, asked him to get involved in “the nuts and bolts” (Stolberg, 2006b, para. 13) of 
Congressional negotiations, publically endorsing the President’s leadership on the issue.   
In the Oval Office address, Bush made his strongest case in support of CIR, especially for 
conservative security-hawks.  However, the response was not universally positive, particularly 
on the right.  House Republicans, the single most important audience for Bush to persuade, 
refused to budge, particularly Tom Tancredo, who refused to accept that deploying the National 
Guard was a concession, saying of the president’s negotiations “I don’t think there’s a thing he 
can say” (Bumiller, 2006c, para. 17) to satisfy anti-immigration conservatives.  Representative 
Steve Pearce explained the mood of border-state Republicans, telling reporters “I’m not going to 
vote for the bill as it currently stands.  Out here, we have a saying: ‘trust your neighbor but brand 
your cattle’” (Bumiller, 2006c, para. 16).  Without those Congressional Republicans on board, 
Bush was out on a very dangerous limb.  If the House could convince their Senate counterparts 
that compromise would never occur, many conservative lawmakers would not risk supporting a 
bill that would be used against them in the next election.  Still, Bush had aggressively moved 
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from faulty strategies in the inception stage through a crisis period marked by two counter-
movements towards consummation in a matter of weeks.  On May 25th, the Senate passed 
comprehensive legislation, and all that remained to be seen was whether Bush had the political 
clout to guide negotiations between the two chambers.  He had already conceded ground on 
militarization of the border and border fencing, but House Republicans remained obstinate.   
A few weeks later, Bush attacked Congressional Republicans who wanted to wait until 
after the midterm elections to move forward on immigration reform (Stolberg, 2006a), trying 
unsuccessfully to hold his opposition accountable for their reluctance to act.  However, the 
Senate postponed a vote to send immigration reform to conference, at which point Bush had to 
rely on the support he had generated among the American public to punish anti-immigration 
Republicans at the polls.  With little else to offer his opposition, Bush needed the American 
people to pressure the Senate to vote to enter conference with the House and further pressure the 
conference committee to enact Bush’s proposal.  This effort will be the focus of the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
With each step Bush took towards the right, the right took a step back.  If he offered 
drones, Tancredo asked him for military support.  When he gave military support, Sensenbrenner 
wanted more border fencing.  When he agreed to negotiate on border fencing, Republicans 
simply rejected compromise out of hand, taking none of Bush’s offers seriously.  As an example, 
Tom Delay gave an interview in 2005 in which he outlined the concessions he would need before 
he would vote for a temporary worker program.  He considered the Predator drone the most 
important tool for securing the border, and wanted Predators to supplement border fencing. As he 
told the Los Angeles Times, “we can set up our systems with Predators and everything,” an 
unrealistic policy demand.  “Ultimately, we need to enforce our laws” he continued, “And then, 
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they’ll be willing to talk about a guest-worker program” (“Interview with Tom Delay,” 
2005).  By 2006, Bush had offered a great number of concessions to the right, including the 
seeing eye wall comprised of Predators that held primary importance for DeLay and a variety of 
programs to enforce the laws on the books, including a massive increase in resources for the 
Border Patrol, a workplace verification system to enforce laws on the interior, requiring guest 
workers to return home before they could apply for citizenship, ending family tie visas, and 
requiring illegal immigrants currently living in the nation to get in the back of the citizenship 
line.  One by one, Bush either added concessions to his proposal or unilaterally made them 
happen, like deploying the National Guard to the Rio Grande.  Still, it was not enough for 
Republicans to budge on the temporary worker program. 
Bush’s strategies of mollifying the right with tough language and actions while ironically 
bemoaning emotional reactions had potential to produce action.  Moreover, the right gave no 
indication that they were satisfied with Bush’s efforts.  Rush Limbaugh demonstrated the lengths 
to which the right-wing was willing to go in order to avoid any compromise. Any concession 
from the president, he warned his audience, demonstrated “a vacuum of moral authority visited 
on the present by the shames of the past” (Limbaugh, 2006a, Para. 15), which proved that Bush 
was no more than a race traitor, victimized by “those elements of non-white humanity” 
(Limbaush, 2006b, Para. 14) who targeted powerful white men, even as they were “slimed as 
bigots” (Limbaugh, 2006b, para. 15).  Bush was getting nowhere with lawmakers, and on the 
radio compromise was treated as a sign of weakness.   
After his Tucson address, the national audience was not engaged, and the anti-immigrant 
leaders moved to the right, taking some conservatives with them.  After Irvine, the far right 
refused any compromise.  After the Oval Office address, polls from Gallup and Pew showed the 
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public supported Bush, but the far right remained unmoved.  His rhetoric was working with 
everyone except his most important audience, who had been inculcated by the hyper-partisan 
world that Bush helped create.  This meant that there was no longer a reasoned middle ground 






Chapter Five: A Rhetoric of Moderate Middle Ground 
After spending late spring 2006 in a campaign to develop public support for 
comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), George W. Bush moved away from the topic as the 
midterms approached.  He had not generated a public mandate for the issue on which 
policymakers wanted to campaign and few in Congress were interested in campaigning with him 
while his personal popularity was at its nadir (Balz, 2006a; Abramowitz, 2006; Conroy, 
2006).  With the president sidelined, the elections became a trial in absentia for the Bush 
administration (Langer, 2006; Linden, 2006) and a referendum on the future of the Republican 
party (Balz, 2006b).   
Democrats dominated the 2006 election, taking control of both chambers of Congress 
(CNN Elections, 2006). All told, the GOP lost 30 seats in the House of Representatives, and 
became the minority party in that chamber for the first time since the “Contract with America” in 
1994 (Hawley, 2013).  Without a compromise on immigration in place, news reports were quick 
to blame the loss on Republicans’ anti-immigration stance. Latinos overwhelmingly supported 
Democrats, “taking back a significant portion of the support they had granted the Republicans 
just two years earlier” (“Latinos and the 2006 midterm election," 2006, Para. 1).  As Latinos 
veered left, they favored pro-immigration conservatives as rarely as they did the less-friendly 
security hawks in the GOP (Hawley, 2013), punishing the moderate Republicans who remained 
with Bush on CIR.   
However, while Latinos turned against Republicans, few individual Republicans were 
hurt by the Latino exodus.  Among the 75 closest House races, only one took place in a district 
where Latinos represented at least 20% of registered voters, and none of the Senate races in 
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which a Democrat defeated a Republican incumbent occurred in a heavily-Latino state (Hawley, 
2013).  While the party as a whole lost 30 seats, Latinos exceeded 10% of registered voters in 
only four of those districts (“Latinos and the 2006 midterm election," 2006, Para. 1). 
In fact, many of the most vocal anti-immigrant Republicans were buoyed by their right-
wing stance on the topic.  For example, Tom Tancredo maintained virtually the same support in 
the 2006 election as he enjoyed in the previous two, in spite of Colorado voters following the 
country’s overall move to the left (CNN Elections, 2002; 2004; 2006).  Thus, failing to act on 
immigration clearly hurt the party in national polling, but it had little effect on anti-immigration 
reform Republicans in Congress, largely because their districts had been drawn to minimize the 
effects of Latino voting blocs.  Paradoxically, backlash against immigration reform may have 
strengthened the hand of the far-right at the same time it weakened the party overall. 
This result had been forecast in late 2006, after Bush’s “Future of Immigration Reform” 
address in Tucson, when then House majority leader Tom Delay held a series of close-door 
meetings with anti-immigration Republicans from both chambers of Congress.  The group was 
debating whether immigration reform was more beneficial for upcoming election campaigns as a 
legislative victory, albeit one based on compromise, or as an issue that was still up for debate 
(Morris, 2006). As a result of those meetings, the June special election in California’s 50th 
Congressional district was used as the test case for anti-immigration campaigning (Ayon, 
2006).  The southern California seat had been vacated by Duke Cunningham, “the most corrupt 
member of Congress ever if measured by the amount of bribes he admitted accepting” (Condon, 
2014), and Republicans were unlikely to keep it due to plummeting Republican popularity and 
the scandal under which Cunningham left office (Perry, 2006).  When Republican Brian Bilbray 
rode anti-immigrant rhetoric to a surprise victory, the party leadership was 
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ecstatic.  Congressional Republicans had found an issue to drive their base to the polls, separate 
themselves from an unpopular president, and protect themselves from challenges on the right, all 
without conceding policy ground to the left.  “All of a sudden,” remembered Republican 
Congressperson Jeff Flake, “Bilbray becomes our model” (Morris, 2006, Para. 23), a distressing 
development for long-time CIR advocates like Flake.  
Democrats enjoyed a majority in both chambers, but many potential supporters from both 
parties were skittish about immigration reform.  Democrats were anxious to begin the lame-duck 
phase of the Bush era, and preferred to pass CIR with a Democrat in the White House (Weisman 
& VandeHei, 2006; Baker & Fletcher, 2006).  Some Democrats were also concerned about how 
a guest worker program might affect organized labor, a topic about which the AFL-CIO 
reminded the Democrat beneficiaries of their campaign largesse.  The combination of fervent 
conservative opposition to immigration reform and a weakening party brand put Bush in a very 
difficult spot and across the aisle his bipartisan support was looking shaky. 
Barriers and Goals 
Bush knew that time was short to accomplish comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), 
because by early 2007 the nation would be consumed by the presidential election.  He had 
already lost time due to the midterms, and in the lead up to those elections he had been reluctant 
to publically attack fellow Republicans for deserting him on CIR as they faced significant 
electoral challenges in many districts.  He needed to act fast or risk losing the attention of the 
American people and the ability to punish the opposition within his own party. 
With Republicans opting for the Bilbray strategy over Rove’s “durable Republican 
majority,” Bush needed to build a bipartisan coalition to get CIR out of the Senate and into a 
conference committee that could accept CIR.  That meant he needed to convince moderate 
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Republicans of the importance of CIR while providing them with cover from attacks on the far 
right.  He also needed to maintain support from Democrats who had become skeptical about 
Bush’s commitment to the immigration-friendly aspects of CIR, particularly in the context of his 
party’s electoral defeat and the security-first rhetoric he employed throughout 2006. 
Strategic Patterns During the Consummation Stage 
To accomplish his goals, Bush created a rhetoric that combined elements of his earlier 
calls for rationality with vivid military imagery. In the rhetoric of the consummation stage, he 
argued that his plan was the only one that could pass through Congress and that the Border Patrol 
could only secure the border with aid from his provisions, putting pragmatism ahead of personal 
convictions. Unlike much of his earlier rhetoric, he minimized the importance of the humanity of 
immigrants or calls to uphold American values.  
He cited the results of his border enforcement efforts, particularly “Operation Jumpstart,” 
in which he deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to the border to train and support Border 
Patrol agents, using visual cues to associate himself with the militarization of the southern 
border.  He attacked his extremist opponents, painting them as unrealistic and out of the 
mainstream of public opinion.  Bush hoped to position CIR as the only viable alternative to mass 
deportations, which might prove as effective at associating his opponents with a fringe strategy 
as they had been when associating his proposal with amnesty.  He defended his proposal as a 
reasonable alternative to the excesses of both sides, and a superior alternative to the status quo.  
In doing so, he argued that supporting deportation was actually support for hysteria, nativism, 
and the de facto amnesty of the unenforceable current system. 
Bush pushed his rhetoric of the moderate middle ground in major speeches in Arizona, 
Georgia, and at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C. ahead of floor 
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debates scheduled for late June, frantically seeking the support that had eluded him on 
immigration since 2005. The speeches were very similar in their content, focusing on security 
and rationality. In each address he appeared as often as possible with military and police 
personnel, who also comprised the direct audience.  The speeches were much shorter than those 
he gave earlier in his push for CIR, but came more quickly as he had fewer issues to push that 
might have taken his attention as the deadline for the bill drew nearer.  
 Promises made, promises kept.  As George W. Bush began the final push for CIR, he 
returned to where his push started.  Between the middle of 2006 and the middle of 2007, Bush 
spoke in Arizona three times, and when he was not physically in Arizona, he made constant 
reference to the primary themes of his 2005 Tucson address, particularly the connection between 
the Commander-In-Chief and border security personnel, referencing the promises he made in his 
initial visit to the border, and tying in local issues to humanity and rational debate.  Just as he 
spoke to the Border Patrol in 2005, his 2007 addresses were presented to military and law 
enforcement personnel, allowing him to discuss keeping his promises directly to those tasked 
with combating illegal immigration on an everyday basis.   
In the 2005 Tucson address, Bush spoke in front of two Border Patrol helicopters 
(Draper, 2005), but such spectacle was rare in the early stages of immigration reform.  By the 
2006-2007 publicity push, Bush was heavily emphasizing military imagery, with official White 
House photos showing him walking the border with the Border Patrol and National Guard, riding 
in Border Patrol dune buggies, and delivering his speech in rolled-up shirt sleeves, without a tie, 
in front of the Border Patrol seal (Draper, 2006a; 2006b).   
In the official White House photos of his April, 2007 speech, “More on Immigration: 
Address to the Arizona Border Patrol” (Bush, 2007a), Bush looked even more like a G.I. Joe 
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action figure than he had in previous visits, posing with Predator Drones and Humvees (Draper, 
2007a; 2007b), joking around with the collected Border Patrol agents (Draper, 2007c), briefing 
fully-armored National Guard soldiers, and delivering his speech on an outdoor stage that he 
shared with bleachers full of uniformed Border Patrol agents, all surrounded by a chain link 
fence, as if he were directly abutting the border (Draper, 2007d).   
Bush’s shirt-sleeves were again rolled up his arms to indicate that he had been working 
outside in the desert heat. “I went to a neighborhood that abuts the border,” he reminded his 
audience, “It’s the place where a lot of people come charging across” (2007a, Para. 7).  Bush was 
dressed as the Commander-in-Chief, tying his clothing to his credibility, and his language helped 
to connect his military role with the military visuals. “I am proud to be the Commander-in-Chief 
of all these units here today,” (2007a, Para. 14), he explained, continuing the strategy of 
associating himself with the Border Patrol that he began in 2005.  While the strategy had not 
worked previously, the images in Arizona now included fully armored troops, all of whom had 
been sent to the border by Bush, a clear indication of his security focus. 
 As he dressed the part of military commander, he used his language to integrate the visual 
cues into the text of his addresses.  Bush was particularly preoccupied with the clothes being 
worn by the Border Patrol, the National Guard, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
officers.  First, he related their uniforms to their work, telling them “I want to thank you all for 
wearing the uniform and doing the tough work necessary, the work that the American people 
expect you to do” (2007a, Para. 4).  He then continued thanking the crowd based on clothing, 
explaining that he was grateful for “the National Guard folks for wearing the uniform” (2007a, 
Para. 13), and even the families of Border Patrol agents, who understood the value of clothing, “I 
want to thank their families for standing by the men and women who wear the uniform during 
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this particular mission” (2007a, Para. 26).  The families made sacrifices for the men and women 
in uniform and he implored his audience to email his gratitude back home, a reminder that the 
National Guard was a military organization and his Border Patrol efforts sent troops into harms 
way.   
In Georgia, Bush used uniforms to represent anticipation, because trainee Border Patrol 
cadets were “getting ready to come and wear the green of the Border Patrol” (2007b, Para. 22).  
In a rare mention of Immigration and Customs officers, who were identified separately from the 
larger Border Patrol apparatus in only one paragraph over the two years he talked about 
immigration reform, Bush identified them through their apparel as well.  “I see a lot of ICE hats” 
(2007b, Para. 24), Bush excitedly told his audience.  
Uniforms also represented privileged knowledge that civilians did not understand, “Men 
and women who wear the uniform understand what's going on” (2007b, Para. 18). His focus on 
clothing and appearances highlighted the key distinctions between Bush and his opponents, 
which included that he had come to the border and that he provided the troops deployed to the 
Rio Grande, while other policymakers remained on Capitol Hill, far away from the critical 
mission.  Bush implored lawmakers to “give us a chance to make it easier for the folks who wear 
the uniform along our borders to do their job” (2007b, Para. 35), offering them the opportunity to 
“show leadership and solve this problem once and for all, so the people who wear the uniform in 
this crowd can do the job we expect them to do” (2007b, Para. 57). 
Visually, the National Guard stood out from the Border Patrol in every image.  Border 
Patrol agents looked like law enforcement personnel, wearing uniforms that resembled police 
officers, albeit in a green palette instead of blue.  National Guard troops could not look less like 
typical police officers, wearing fatigues, bulletproof vests, and carrying assault rifles.  Each time 
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he reminded his audience that he had been the one “to deploy 6,000 National Guard members to 
provide the Border Patrol with immediate reinforcements” (2007a, Para. 25), he reminded them 
of the overwhelming military might he brought to border security and when he referenced 
uniforms, he drew the listeners’ focus back to that clear distinction.  He further supported his 
military association with language like “deploy”(2007a, Para. 25), “deter” (Para. 27; Para. 30), 
and “threat” (2007b, Para. 40) when discussing illegal immigration.  He referred to his recent 
efforts as “Operation Jump Start," invoking the military title for the deployment of National 
Guard members to the border.    
 Having established his connection with the gathered security personnel through visual 
associations, Bush explained how the overwhelming and obviously visible military presence 
represented the first of many promises Bush had kept on immigration reform.  He began the 
Yuma address by reminding his audience of his frequent visits to Arizona, during which he had 
“gotten to know the Border Patrol” (2007a, Para. 4), before outlining the promises he had made 
to “the people serving in this fine agency” (2007a, Para. 4). He then explained that his return was 
part of a concerted effort “to check on the progress, to make sure that the check wasn't in the 
mail -- it, in fact, had been delivered” (2007a, Para. 5). He demonstrated that he had kept the 
promise to “give you the manpower and resources you need to do your job” (Para. 5), which 
meant that he could be trusted on border security.   
Much of Bush’s discussion of border security listed the problems the agency faced when 
he visited before and how his efforts had rectified the problem. In Yuma, he reminded his 
audience that when he last visited, “we were understaffed here.  We weren’t using enough 
technology to enable those who work here to do the job the American people expect” (2007a, 
Para. 5).  Thanks to the Bush administration, things were much different, he argued, explaining 
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that his administration “doubled the funding for border security since I've been the President” 
(2007a, Para. 20).   His efforts were bearing fruit already, because “the funding is increasing 
manpower” (2007a, Para. 20), which was a key step towards the ultimate goal of doubling “the 
size of the Border Patrol” (2007a, Para. 22), and the success of his plan was exemplified by the 
number of border arrests dropping from “an average of more than 400 people a day…to fewer 
than 140 a day” (2007a, Para. 27).    
In each of his speeches in the consummation stage, Bush used virtually identical claims 
to make the same basic arguments.  He repeated the argument that border security funding had 
doubled during his tenure, that he eventually wanted to double the personnel for the Border 
Patrol, and that his efforts were already showing results, which was proven by the shrinking 
number of arrests.  In Glynco, he explained “We've doubled the funding for border security since 
I took office” (2007b, Para. 15), which meant that “the more manpower is on the border, the 
more likely it is we'll be able to enforce the border” (2007b, Para. 16), echoing the Yuma 
address.  He invited his Glynco audience to judge for themselves, because they could “tell when 
the border is better defended because the number of arrests go down… arrests have gone down 
by 27 percent over the past year on the southern border” (2007b, Para. 19).  Again in Washington 
he reported that “we're going to double” the number of Border Patrol agents, again maintaining a 
narrow focus and language consistency to force discussion onto very narrow ground. 
Bush also repeated his claims that increased funding resulted in more effective 
infrastructure and he was most fond of referencing Predator drones and border fencing, one a 
high-tech cutting edge solution that demonstrated the military might Bush had authorized, the 
other a low-tech solution favored most vocally by the far-right.  Both reinforced Bush’s security 
credentials. Predator drones were, he argued, “the most sophisticated technology we have,” 
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(2007a, Para. 23). Newly installed border fencing and road infrastructure also were “really 
important to basically leverage the manpower” (2007a, Para. 23) of Border Patrol agents.  
Perhaps no piece of military technology looked more alien and futuristic in 2007 than the 
Predator and its use on the border represented clear evidence of the technology and resources he 
delivered to the border and by extension his commitment to border security.    
Pragmatism.  If his audience was having trouble deciding between deportation and 
comprehensive reforms, Bush used the various military and security personnel in his direct 
audience as evidence of the correctness of his plan. Their attendance at each speech was also a 
form of assent to support CIR, and when he addressed them specifically they acted as a proxy for 
the audience so he could develop support from the associations he had drawn between himself 
and the security agencies throughout his speeches. His main case was that deportation-only 
plans, like the ones he attributed to the right, were impractical and would unduly burden security 
efforts on the ground.   
In his 2007 addresses, Bush applied a pragmatic lens to amnesty as well, arguing “People 
say, why not have amnesty? Well, the reason why is because 10 years from now you don't want 
to have a President having to address the next 11 million people who might be here illegally” 
(2007a, Para. 39).  After giving that practical argument, he then listed his secondary concern, 
which had at one point been the primary reason for immigration reform: “we're a nation of law, 
and we expect people to uphold the law” (2007a, Para. 39).  Bush had clearly put pragmatism 
ahead of ideology and throughout the speech he made sure to place pragmatic and material 
concerns ahead of ideological ones. 
Unlike the impractical deportation-only schemes, a CIR effort was “necessary so that the 
Border Patrol agents down here can do their job more effectively” (2007a, Para. 8).  He told the 
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collected security personnel that the “good bill” around which “people generally want to come 
together” to pass would “make your job a lot easier” (2007a, Para. 45), but it was endangered by 
distant Congressional ideologues. Anyone who wanted to know the truth could ask the “older 
hands” among the Border Patrol who would “tell some of the younger folks that things have 
changed significantly” (2007a, Para. 15) under the Bush administration.  Unlike civilians in 
Congress and on the radio, “Men and women who wear the uniform understand what's going on. 
There's a focused, concerted effort to enforce our border” (2007b, Para. 45).  Congress did not 
share Bush’s connection to the military, so while the far right would casually claim “they’re not 
doing anything to secure the border,” (2007b, Para. 45) those claims simply proved their 
ignorance.  
Mass deportation should be rejected on pragmatic grounds because, according to Bush,  
“it's just an impractical position; it's not going to work. It may sound good. It may make nice 
sound bite news. It won't happen” (2007a, Para. 41).  Continuing the pattern from his Oval 
Office address, Bush attacked deportation not as much on moral grounds, but because the idea 
was “unreasonable” (2007a, Para. 47).  If mass deportation were to pass into law, the Border 
Patrol would have to chase down every illegal immigrant, instead of focusing on dangerous 
criminals, while CIR would “allow federal agents to focus on apprehending violent criminals and 
terrorists who are a threat to our country rather than people who want to work here” (2007b, 
Para. 44).  The split was clear and Bush repeated the juxtaposition of family-loving immigrants 
and terrorists in several of his speeches. For example, in Yuma he argued CIR would result in 
“Border Patrol agents chasing down terrorists and gun runners and dope runners as opposed to 
people who are coming to do jobs Americans aren't doing” (2007a, Para. 45).   
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Even if his audience believed in deportation, it was not politically feasible, thus 
necessitating compromise.  No bill could garner mainstream support if it promised to “rout 
people out of our society and ‘send them home.’ It's just not going to happen. And so good 
people have come together and derived a solution based upon compromises that addresses this 
problem” (2007b, Para. 13), a sentiment that was clearer than Bush’s syntax.  Bush recognized 
the difficulty of negotiating with his opposition, but the difficulty of drafting a bill that could 
secure the border and pass both houses meant that he needed “to work with the Republicans and 
Democrats to get the job done” (2007c, Para. 3).  Bush characterized those negotiations as 
avoiding the extremes of amnesty and deportation, lending a sense of urgency to his bipartisan 
efforts for the majority of Americans, who preferred neither wholesale deportation nor wholesale 
amnesty.  He said of the negotiations that he was “working closely with Republicans and 
Democrats to find a practical answer that lies between granting automatic citizenship to every 
illegal immigrant and deporting every illegal immigrant” (2007a, Para. 40). 
Bush punches back.  Leading up to the midterm election, Bush had been unwilling to 
publically attack the far-right border security-hawks in his own party.  When he discussed the 
overwhelming vitriol of the public debate, he argued that neither side was acting reasonably, and 
that he alone represented the middle ground. At the same time, those who were familiar with 
immigration reform efforts could see that Bush was targeting the right, even if that subtlety was 
lost on typical Americans.   
After the election, Bush employed a more aggressive strategy toward the right.  He 
claimed that they were motivated by prejudice and attacked their naïve belief that “the best way 
to deal with 11 million to 12 million people is to get them to leave the country” (Bush, 2007b, 
Para. 12).  He argued the major issue preventing “Republicans and Democrats [from coming] 
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together to resolve outstanding issues” (2007a, Para. 8) on immigration reform was the far-
right’s “name-calling and finger-pointing” (2007c, Para. 19), which was no more than “empty 
political rhetoric” (2007b, Para. 49) by those who lacked the “courage to go back to their districts 
and explain exactly what this bill is all about” (2007b, Para. 49).  “It's an emotional issue,” Bush 
explained, once again condemning those who gave into their emotions.  Rather, he argued for 
calm and rational analysis, observing “people have got deep convictions. And my hope is that we 
can have a serious and civil and conclusive debate. And so we'll continue to work with members 
of both political parties” (2007a, Para. 40).   
That debate had not occurred because of the vitriol on the right, according to the 
President. Security-hawks were motivated by prejudice, and were “trying to frighten our fellow 
citizens” (Para. 49) with amnesty. “If you want to scare the American people, what you say is, 
the bill is an amnesty bill” (2007b, Para. 49).  Conservatives were using the term amnesty and 
the idea of deportation to “inflame passion” (2007b, Para. 12), even though doing so was actively 
manipulating the American people.  “If you want to kill a bill, then you just go around America 
saying, this is amnesty. In other words, there are some words that elicit strong reactions from our 
fellow citizens,” he added, “those who call it amnesty, they're just trying to, in my judgment, 
frighten people about the bill” (2007c, Para. 12).  
Bush offered his audience an alternative to the nativist fears and manipulative tactics of 
the right in his 2007 addresses.  “America must not fear diversity,” Bush implored (2007c, Para. 
17), “we ought to welcome diversity. We ought to have confidence in what we have done in the 
past, and not lose confidence about what we will do in the future” (2007c, Para. 17).  What made 
America great, in Bush’s view, was that “we welcome people like that in a legal way; that 
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throughout our history there have been the stories of people who have enriched our soul and 
lifted our spirit by coming to America” (2007c, Para. 15).  
The middle ground. A final aspect of Bush’s rhetoric of militant moderation combined 
themes of pragmatism with redefinition, explaining that the failings of the current system were a 
de facto amnesty, making inaction the worst possible option.  To make this case, Bush combined 
some of his earlier strategies for defending rationality with an increased emphasis on urgency 
and efficacy.  Earlier speeches had used immigrants’ inherent humanity to justify CIR, and 
decried the emotional outbursts occurring in public debates, strategies he continued to use in 
2007.  While Americans had “deep convictions” on “an emotional issue,” Bush urged them to 
trust the political process as he worked “with both political parties” (2007a, Para. 44) to craft a 
bill that could help the Border Patrol and satisfy Americans.   
However, humanitarian claims were much less frequent in his 2007 addresses than they 
had been previously.  Instead, he characterized emotional reactions as negative because they 
prevented government action, and government action was necessary to end the de facto amnesty 
of the status quo, a problem that “had been growing for decades” (2007a, Para. 16).  Like 
amnesty, government inaction failed to deter future immigration by creating “a perception that 
America was not serious about enforcing our immigration laws and that they could be broken 
without consequence” (2007a, Para. 16).   
The fault for the current system was that previous regimes had not taken border security 
seriously enough, so “past efforts at reform did not do enough to secure our borders” (2007a, 
Para. 16) because they “failed to address the economic reasons behind illegal immigration” 
(2007a, Para. 17).  Therefore, without a guest worker program that could change the economic 
calculus for immigrants, the right’s immigration proposal was doomed to the same failures as the 
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current system.  The “sensible” solution was to find “a comprehensive plan” that heeded the 
lessons of the past and understood that “all elements of the issue must be addressed together” 
(2007a, Para. 18).  
The rhetoric Bush used in the consummation stage was underpinned by his argument 
about the failures of the status quo. Bush described the situation before his efforts as broken.  
“Prior to the administration addressing the problem we had…catch and release” (2007a, Para. 
12), a policy which, when combined with weak interior verification efforts and budget shortfalls, 
discouraged the hard working personnel on the ground. Bush decried the “endless partisan 
bickering” (2007a, Para. 27) that prevented succesful action, “by talking about only one aspect of 
the problem” (2007a, Para. 30), rather than a comprehensive solution that “learns from the 
mistakes of the past...If people are interested in fixing a system that’s broken, this bill is the best 
way to do so.  It answers the longstanding concerns of the American people” (2007a, Para. 32).  
Bipartisanship and rationality were the cornerstones for moving away from the amnesty of the 
status quo, because “each side is going to have to give a little bit.  Not everyone is going to get 
what they want, but what matters more is fixing the problem now” (2007a, Para. 27).  Bush 
wanted action and CIR was the most pragmatic and rational way forward.  On this point, his 
focus on the humanity of illegal immigrants all but disappeared.   
In the opening of each of the major addresses in the consummation stage, Bush compared the 
present to the past, and in the closing he compared the present to the future.  The past was a time 
of broken promises and nonsensical policies that failed to deal with the realities on the ground.  
The introduction to the June Eisenhower Executive Office Building speech explains: 
I say the system isn't working because there's a lot of Americans who say that the 
government is not enforcing our border. I say the system is broken because there are 
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people coming into America to do work that Americans are not doing, and there are 
good, decent employers who unknowingly are hiring them, which is against the law. 
The system is broken, in my judgment, because there are 11 million to 12 million 
people living in the shadows of a free society. The system is broken because there are 
people who are exploiting human beings for material gain. There are coyotes-- those are 
human smugglers -- charging decent people large sums of money to come and work to 
put food on the table for their families. 
The past was the worst form of amnesty, something the Border Patrol recognized, he said:  “You 
had your Border Patrol working hard, finding somebody trying to sneak into our country 
illegally” (2007a, Para. 20), but failing to slow illegal immigration because the system 
undermined their efforts at every turn, which “discouraged our Border Patrol agents. I talked to 
too many agents and heard too many stories about people saying, wait a minute, I'm tired of 
doing my job on the front line of protecting the border only to have the people that I have 
stopped coming in meld into our society” (2007a, Para. 20).   
While the early paragraphs of each address marked the present as a time of action to 
move away from the amnesty of the status quo, the conclusion of each address highlighted the 
need for bipartisan action and the need for the people to pressure Congress to achieve it.  In 
Yuma, he asked for “people not to give up, no matter how hard it looks from a legislative 
perspective” (Para. 46).  In Glynco, he asked “for members of both political parties to stand up 
and show courage, and take a leadership role and do what's right for America” (2007b, Para. 59).  
In D.C., he asked for Congress to do “what they ran for office” to do, which was the will of their 
constituents, before promising to “make sure that this debate does not denigrate into name-
calling and finger-pointing” (2007c, Para. 18).  In each case, Bush used his address to connect 
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the past to amnesty, and explain that the present was the moment in which lawmakers could 
exercise reason and demonstrate courage by voting for CIR or they could kill real reform and 
return America to amnesty. 
His addresses in 2007 focused on militaristic imagery, enacting the promises he had kept, 
and supporting a moderate middle ground.  He claimed the moderate position in opposition to the 
largely non-existent blocs that supported deportation-only or amnesty-only schemes.  He then 
attacked the far right, called for compromise and bipartisanship and focused on pragmatic 
solutions to the problem.  Bush asked “for a chance to fix this problem” (2007b, Para. 36) and 
warned that his opposition would “sacrifice the good for the sake of the perfect” (2007c, Para. 9), 
supporting his claim that his opposition preferred political gamesmanship, manipulation, and 
prejudice to real-world practical solutions that could fix the mistakes of the past.   
Outcomes 
Bush tried to personally whip enough support to pass CIR, working as close to the 
deadline as he could.  “The president made a last-ditch round of phone calls” on June 28th, the 
day of the final vote, “to try to rescue the bill, but with his poll numbers at record lows, his 
appeals proved fruitless” (Weisman, 2007, Para. 15). In the end, 37 Republicans voted against 
the bill, along with 15 Democrats and Independent Bernie Sanders (Pear & Hulse, 2007).  The 
bill that was debated in late June was very different from the one the Senate had passed in 2006, 
and the changes were exclusively concessions to conservative security hawks, but even with 
additional security and verification measures in place, nine Republicans who voted for the bill in 
2006 changed their votes in the face of public pressure (Kondracke, 2007, Para. 10).  
 The Senate debated the merits of a conference committee on June 28th, during which a 
variety of riders and amendments were added to the bill, each one requiring additional debate 
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and an additional vote, stretching late into the night.  A number of efforts were made to end 
debate and vote on the bill, but when a cloture vote was called, it failed 53 to 46, fourteen votes 
shy of the 60 needed to move to a full vote on the bill (Kiely, 2007).  Senate majority leader 
Harry Reid removed the bill from consideration and it never came up again during the Bush 
administration. During Independence Day weekend, Ted Kennedy called the president to let him 
know that CIR would not be brought up in the Senate again because supporters had no hope to 
get enough votes to invoke cloture (Bush, 2010, p. 306), with many Democrats abandoning the 
reforms as the outcome of the vote became clear. 
The exact details of the final Senate negotiations are unclear, but most of the public 
blame fell on conservative security hawks on Capitol Hill and “radio and TV shouters such as 
Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh...who convinced masses of citizens that the Kyl-Kennedy [sic] 
bill still amounted to ‘amnesty’ for 12 million illegal immigrants” (Kondracke, 2007, Para. 12).  
The far right “stirred up anti-Hispanic racism and certainly anti-immigrant nativism” 
(Kondracke, 2007, Para. 13), prompting Ted Kennedy to compare Congressional Republicans to 
the Jim Crow-era segregationists, before proclaiming that the lessons of history taught “ you 
cannot stop the march for progress in the United States” (Weisman, 2007, Para. 10). 
 Anti-immigration Republicans claimed to vote on principle, with David Vitter calling the 
accusations of racism “the height of ugliness and arrogance" (Weisman, 2007, Para. 12).  Jeff 
Sessions, a vocal critic of CIR, said he voted against the bill simply because "it would not 
work...it would result in 8.7 million more people in the next 20 years here illegally" (“Crushing 
Defeat,” 2007, Para. 6-7).  At the same time, talk radio hosts such as Rush Limbaugh were 
openly discussing the racial dimensions of the issue and blaming Bush for conceding to liberals 
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“in order to continue to promote this guilt, to show that we're still committing these sins” 
(Limabaugh, 2006b, Para. 14-15).  
Pro-immigration Republicans disputed the idea that the far right was solely responsible 
for the ultimate failure of the bill, particularly John McCain, who made the case that Barack 
Obama was at least partially responsible for the bill’s demise.  In the pro-immigration 
Republican version of events, the bill died because of the Dorgan amendment, a so-called 
“poison pill” (Novak, 2010) provision that was supported by pro-labor Democrats and would 
have ended key provisions tied to the temporary worker program after five years.  In his view, 
the amendment frightened away potential support for the bill (Holan, 2010).  2008 Democratic 
presidential front-runners Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both supported the amendment 
(“U.S. Congress Votes Database,” 2015), lending support to the claim that Democrats were in “a 
campaign cycle on fast-forward” (“Immigration bill crumbles,” 2007) and preferred to run 
against anti-immigration Republicans in 2008 than pass a compromise bill (Weisman & 
VandeHei, 2006; Baker & Fletcher, 2006), particularly if killing the bill meant financial support 
from organized labor (Pear & Hulse, 2007; Sheppard, 2010).  In the end, though, the Democrats 
would have been more likely to support the bill if Bush had not moved so far to the right in his 
efforts to develop conservative support.   
 What is clear is that Congress ignored the will of the American people.  “Voters wanted 
an immigration deal,” Harry Reid acknowledged, “The problem was on the inside of this Senate 
chamber’” (Balz, 2007, Para. 5).  A Republican Senator agreed with Reid, but internalized the 
blame, calling his own vote against immigration reform "a profile in political cowardice" 
(Kondracke, 2007, Para. 1).  A June Gallup poll showed that a majority of Americans wanted an 
immigration bill similar to the one Bush favored (Carroll, 2007, Para. 4), and about half of the 
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people who did not favor comprehensive reforms preferred a guest-worker program to inaction, 
which was the most contentious point in the debate Carroll, 2007, Para. 7).  Republican Senator 
Mel Martinez summarized his chamber’s failings quite bluntly: "The United States Senate," he 
argued ”today bipartisanly failed the American people. That's plain and simple." (Balz, 2007, 
Para. 6).  Chuck Schumer echoed Martinez’s sentiment, calling the failure of CIR a "sad day for 
America"  (“Crushing Defeat," 2007, Para. 8), because "everyone knows that our immigration 
laws are broken and a country loses some of its greatness when it can't fix a problem that 
everyone knows is broken (“Crushing Defeat," 2007, Para. 9).   
For his part, Bush also regretted the government’s failure to pass a good bill despite the 
fact that Americans ranked illegal immigration as the second most important issue facing the 
country at the time (Carroll, Para. 9). He said one of “the top concerns of the American people” 
was CIR, which made “Congress's failure to act on it” (Weisman, 2007, Para. 7) so 
disappointing.  He was not willing to take the blame, however.  Congress was at fault, and they 
needed “to prove to the American people that it can come together on hard issues," Bush said  
(“Crushing Defeat," 2007, Para. 4).   
For many observers, the failure of CIR “added up to another example of a polarized 
political system in which the center could not hold” (Balz, 2007, Para. 2).  The collapse of the 
bill instilled “deep doubt on whether America's current political leaders can solve any large 
problem, especially when demagogues can stir up passion against it” (Kondracke, 2007, Para. 3). 
Bush clearly bore some responsibility for the failure to act.  Bush presided over the rise of such 
toxic partisanship and he exploited that environment when it suited him.  The fact that he was 
unable to walk the vitriolic rhetoric back, find a middle ground, or pass a bill so clearly 
important to him is a scathing indictment of his presidency. 
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No matter the details of the final Senate vote, CIR died because of the xenophobic fear 
mongering on the far-right, which Bush had failed to quell for nearly two years.  Conversation 
never progressed past amnesty, concessions flowed in only one direction, and Bush failed to 
achieve CIR.  Neither Bush’s efforts to mollify the right nor attacking them succeeded. Calling 
for rationality did little to quell the consequence-free accusations on talk-radio.  If anything, it 
lent credence to the attacks lobbed at the administration by Rush Limbaugh and his colleagues, 
who saw Bush’s proposal as a form of amnesty for illegal immigrants.  
         The strategies Bush maintained from previous stages of the movement also failed to 
resonate with the American audience at large.  The irony of creating a binary, exclusionary frame 
while he called for rational discussion should have been evident to him at the time, just as the 
irony of calling for emotion-free discussion while he wanted to recognize immigrants’ humanity 
should have been evident the previous year.  Bush could create elaborate rhetorical strategies, but 
they were going to fall on deaf ears as long as he let the right shout over him and frame the 
debate around amnesty.  It’s no wonder, then, that the same Gallup poll that showed 
unprecedented support for CIR also described a general population that did not understand the 
bill.  Furthermore, Republicans were four times as likely to feel negatively about Bush because 
of immigration reform than Democrats or moderates, even when they generally supported the 
comprehensive approach (Carroll, 2007).  
        In the consummation stage, Bush developed a strategy that was almost entirely defensive 
and almost entirely aimed at the audience least likely to help him.  Consequently, by late summer 
2007, CIR was dead. Bush would not shepherd another significant piece of legislation through 




Chapter Six:  The Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
 When George W. Bush sought wholesale change of America’s immigration policies in 
his second term, he undertook a massive public outreach campaign that lasted nearly two years 
and consumed his attention and political capital for the duration of his efforts.  His audience in 
America at large, who seemed to be favorable and slightly confused at the outset, turned away 
from him, either joining in a cacophony of polarized screaming or remaining unaware that the 
solution that they wanted was best represented by the policy proposal supported by the President 
and Senate Democrats.  His popularity tanked, he failed to pass the bill he wanted, and his 
presidency entered the lame duck phase. 
 Most of the major players in comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) left the battle in a 
worse state for their efforts.  Pro-immigration Democrats and other immigration supporters did 
not get a fair hearing for a generally popular idea, and even worse, were faced with a political 
environment poisoned for future debates.  Latinos’ suspicions of Anglos were confirmed, as 
public conversation veered into openly nativist and xenophobic territory, giving voice to the 
anxieties underpinning many Anglos’ unwillingness to surrender their majority status.  
Republicans were no better off than their opponents, having lost the potential electoral might of 
Karl Rove’s durable Republican majority as Latino voters fled from the party en masse.  The 
Border Patrol and other security agencies gained additional resources during the push, but 
without the interior enforcement and temporary worker visa programs in the bill, they missed out 
on most of the aid they desperately needed.  On a more general level, it was just as difficult to 
enter the country legally as it had been in 2005 and only slightly more difficult to do so illegally, 
answering none of the concerns raised by the Jordan commission a decade before. 
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 The few winners in the CIR debacle were the most exploitative and morally repugnant 
agents in the scene, who perversely had the least at stake in the negotiations.  As discussed 
earlier, Tom Tancredo gained a second political life by recreating his image as an anti-
immigration ideologue, most recently running in 2014 for the Republican nomination for 
Governor of Colorado and founding the American Legacy Alliance Super PAC, which is 
dedicated to fighting illegal immigration (Grenoble, 2011).  While Brian Bilbray lost his seat to 
decennial redistricting, he remained a vocal public figure whenever immigration reform came 
back into the news, and began lobbying for anti-immigration NGOs (Pear, 2007). 
Rush Limbaugh used the immigration debate as a springboard to a $400 million contract 
extension with Clear Channel in 2008 (Ryan, 2008), making him arguably the highest paid radio 
host in America, depending on various accounting factors.  The exorbitant figures in the deal 
were based less on the considerable size of Limbaugh’s audience than it was based on the loyalty 
of the “Dittoheads,” on whom Limbaugh could count to push his views even after the radio was 
turned off (Chafets, 2008).  Limbaugh demonstrated the power of the Dittoheads during the 
immigration debates, and the frustration Trent Lott expressed as the Dittoheads flooded Senate 
phone lines was a strong argument for Limbaugh’s influence when negotiating with advertisers 
(Mindlin, 2008). 
 The victory of the villains in comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) is a reminder that 
social movements tend to unfold similarly to dramas. Social movements are generally comprised 
of three acts that progress from an inception stage in which characters, motivations, and 
obstacles are introduced or crystallized, to a crisis stage in which the movement responds to the 
antagonism of counter-movements or institutional opposition, to a consummation stage in which 
victory or defeat may be achieved.  For CIR, the drama unfolded in fits and starts, so Bush was 
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tending to purposes normally served in the inception stage even as he moved into the 
consummation stage. The crisis stage stagnated for nearly a year before it rapidly accelerated 
into the consummation stage over a few weeks.  Such an odd example of a drama is still a drama, 
and should have “some spot to which all roads lead” (Burke, 1973, p. 192), which is how 
Kenneth Burke described the progression of social movements.  On a basic level, the goal of 
Bush’s push for CIR was the passage of a piece of legislation that improved border security and 
provided a path to citizenship for some portion of the 11 million illegal immigrants living in the 
country, but the policy was never what the typical Americans in Bush’s audience focused on.  
Instead, the movement was in constant flux, as Bush tried to focus his audience’s attention on 
border security in Tucson, followed by recognition of immigrant humanity in Irvine, which he 
then abandoned in favor of a return to border security in the Oval Office address, before defining 
CIR as an opposition to amnesty.  The villains in his narratives were difficult to identify, starting 
as distant bureaucrats, followed by extremist leaders on both sides of the debate, before 
becoming the ignorant masses who wanted either amnesty or deportation for all illegal 
immigrants.  In summary, if the push for CIR was a drama, it was a very poorly planned and 
executed one, in large part because of significant errors by President Bush. 
Implications 
In this dissertation, I hoped to make three general contributions to scholarship.  First, I 
followed David Zarefsky’s (1980) direction to examine the rhetorical dimensions of social 
movements in order to more fully develop the historical record of the events in which the social 
movement took place, paying specific attention to president-directed movements.  Secondly, I 
hoped to discover the progression of purpose and strategies in Bush’s push for CIR.  Finally, I 
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hoped to more fully answer several outstanding questions regarding the Bush administration and 
immigration rhetoric within the literature discussed in chapter two. 
Historical record.  Bush conceded the effectiveness of conservative talk radio hosts in 
general and Limbaugh specifically when the President visited the latter’s syndicated radio 
program to publicize Decision Points in 2010, but maintained that the overall failure of the 
legislative efforts was the timing of his push.  Had he chosen to push immigration reform in the 
immediate wake of his 2004 victory, Bush argued, Limbaugh would not have gained any 
traction, and the bill would have passed.   
In fact, the primary reason George W. Bush failed to generate the support to pass CIR 
was a terribly designed rhetorical strategy that targeted the wrong audience and then failed to 
address the obstacles and the purposes of a social movement, retarding the movement’s growth. 
In spite of a history with immigration reform dating back to his time as Governor of Texas, the 
President was completely unprepared for the obstinacy and vitriol from the far right, an oversight 
that is particularly surprising when one considers that Texas has more than its share of far right 
and xenophobic loudmouths.  During his first term, Bush occasionally discussed immigration 
reform in general terms, and he returned to the topic for brief moments in his 2005 State of the 
Union Address.  Each time he did so, the far right voiced their displeasure with what they saw as 
his liberal sensibilities. By November 2005’ “Future of Immigration Reform” address in Tucson, 
Bush should have been prepared for the right wing’s reaction and done a better job of seeking 
support among moderates from the outset.    
While immigration scholarship has rarely looked at the effectiveness of various rhetorical 
strategies, one thoroughly covered aspect of the rhetorical situation discussed the audience 
attitudes most likely to contribute to support for immigration reform.  Unfortunately, Bush 
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disregarded most of that research.  Audiences are more likely to support liberal ideas on 
immigration reform if they are more religious, not thinking about crime, and called upon as a 
nation of immigrants thinking of American values.  Bush used far less religion in his appeals for 
CIR than when discussing other issues, possibly due to the polarizing nature of religious rhetoric 
that could conflict with his goals of bipartisanship and compromise. Even when he most 
explicitly referenced God in the Irvine address, he did so within the security framework of 
terrorism, preventing his audience from fully accepting his argument.   
Bush consistently discussed crime as a primary motivation for border security and as he 
did so, he primed his audience to focus more clearly on punitive security measures, which was 
the opposite of what the data told him to do.  He split the criminal acts of coyotes from 
immigrants far too subtly early in his push, and as his push progressed, the militarization of the 
border overwhelmed any motivation he offered that did not focus on security. 
Most interestingly, while Bush sporadically discussed America’s historical tradition as a 
nation of immigrants, he consistently juxtaposed the American value of openness based in the 
humanity of immigrants with the value of lawfulness that condemned immigrants’ presence in 
the country.  In that way, he surrendered what might have been a powerful rhetorical strategy to 
his opponents.  George Lakoff and his various collaborators described the split between the strict 
and nurturing parent frames very similarly to the split between lawfulness and openness, and as 
Bush’s opponents painted CIR as amnesty, they more effectively employed a strict parent frame 
than Bush did. Whether a nurturing parent approach could be effective on immigration reform is 
still not clear, however, because Bush’s simultaneous calls for rationality and security split the 
two, making it difficult to compare between the clear frames of the far right and the murky 
frames used by Bush.   
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All of these audience factors should have been clear to Bush from the outset of his push, 
yet his strategy was naïve in expecting a compassionate response from the far right.  In 
retrospect, the audience factors he ignored, his surprise at the reaction of the far right, and the 
constant revision of his focus describe an overall rhetorical strategy that was not prepared for 
organized opposition or a prolonged campaign. When he did not immediately win the hearts and 
minds of the right wing, he had no exit strategy.  There may be no better single example of 
Bush’s failure to plan for easily predictable reactions to his immigration reform rhetoric than the 
question and answer session in California.  Bush’s inability to field those questions, even when 
they invited the answers he should have prepared, was a microcosm for the administration’s 
failure to adjust to changing audience attitudes throughout Bush’s push for CIR.   
In addition to his failure to effectively use well-established rhetorical strategies and 
audience data, Bush also failed to effectively gain institutional support from obvious sources.  
While the erosion of support from pro-immigration organizations may have been a surprise, 
Bush did little to woo other interest groups.  Most notably, the agriculture industry was 
supportive of a guest worker program.  The Department of Labor reported that over half of all 
farm workers were illegal immigrants in 2007 and that more than 25% of all illegal employees in 
America worked on farms (Goodman, 2014). By 2007, farmers were “very, very nervous about 
the availability and cost of labor in the near future,” (Strickland, 2007), prompting California 
citrus growers to commission the design of robotic replacements for migrant workers, a sign of 
the length to which farmers were willing to go to protect their labor supply.  Generally, farmers 
were supportive of any immigration reform bill that provided them with the labor force they 
needed (Thompson, 2010) and could have been counted on to support any version of CIR with a 
temporary worker provision and oppose any version of CIR without one (Lopez, 2013).  While 
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Bush occasionally mentioned farm labor, he never focused his overall messages on agricultural 
needs.  It is surprising that he did not court the agriculture lobby’s influence more seriously, 
considering the influence agricultural lobbies held with Republicans in many Midwest states and 
the populism associated with farm support during the Bush administration. 
 The presidency and social movements.  The second implication of this research is that 
the rhetoric Bush employed confirms David Zarefsky’s (1980) argument that social movements 
are not fundamentally different from campaigns or government actions.  The primary rhetorical 
constraint that determines the similarity of texts within a genre is purpose (Rowland, 1991), and 
Bush’s purposes in each stage followed the purposes that scholars generally attribute to social 
movements.    
 As Bush entered the inception stage, he needed to garner attention for his effort, generate 
consensus about why illegal immigration was a problem, and establish his credibility as a leader 
who could effect change.  Those purposes are not unique to social movements, however.  
Grabbing an audience’s attention, presenting a clear thesis, and establishing the speaker’s 
credibility are among the requirements for any effort designed to produce or oppose change.  The 
inception stage shares its purpose with virtually every other type of rhetoric that advocates 
action, unsurprising when one interprets Griffin’s (1960, p. 460) observation that movements 
begin when people “rise up and cry No to the existing order” (emphasis in original) as a simple 
recognition of an imperfection demanding action.  An imperfection marked by urgency is, after 
all, simply an exigence, which is a prerequisite in the rhetorical situation. 
 Later stages offer little additional clarity.  In the crisis stage, which chapter four noted is 
less researched than the inception stage, problems arise for the movement that often include the 
rise of counter-movements.  Once again little distinguishes the purposes facing a social 
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movement from typical rhetorical action in the face of opposition.  The same is true of the 
consummation stage, in which the movement succeeds or fails, marked by accomplishing the 
goals of the movement or followers losing interest.  Again, the purposes served and problems 
confronted by social movements are common to many calls advocacy for action or inaction, and 
face few constraints due to their movement structure.  
One distinction that scholars used to distinguish social movements from other forms of 
collective action has been the absence of institutional power available to social movements.  
Bush’s struggle to maintain party support while he was unpopular among the American voting 
base demonstrates the limits of institutional power.  If a president cannot trust his own party 
apparatus, it is unclear how much the institution of the presidency offers a rhetor that is not 
available to social movement leaders.  Bush used a variety of strategies exclusively available to 
him through his role as the President, including speaking in front of stands full of National Guard 
troops, taking photographs in military vehicles, and giving a speech from the Oval Office.  He 
also tried grass root strategies, including speaking in small venues about local concerns, staging 
media events, and trying to adopt the role of outsider taking on bureaucracy, but he had little 
success with any of these, suggesting that institutional advantages were not an important 
distinction between his rhetorical efforts and traditional social movements.  To varying extents 
the counter-movements that opposed Bush were more capable of organizing broad support and 
directing followers than Bush was, whether that involved mailing bricks to Capitol Hill, 
occupying Senate phone lines, or marching in massive public demonstrations, further clouding 
the idea that acting inside traditional power structures is a major advantage that uniquely shapes 
the rhetoric of the presidency, while working outside the system uniquely shapes social 
movement rhetoric.   
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Furthermore, while traditional social movement scholarship focuses on reform 
movements acting against conservative institutions, Bush’s push for CIR was a struggle between 
institutional reform efforts and a conservative movement, further calling into question common 
definition of social movements.  Zarefsky cautioned against the idea that social movement 
rhetoric could be identified as an exclusive and exhaustive category of rhetoric and Bush’s push 
for CIR certainly supported his view. 
A further implication in this research is that Zarefsky may not have gone far enough.  The 
difference between social movement rhetoric and other forms of appeals is slight at best and the 
models offered by research into social movements provides little clear trajectory for social 
movement leaders to follow.  While social movement criticism provides a helpful device to 
organize a large text or series of smaller texts working along the same progression, that criticism 
is not prescriptive, due to the lack of constraining purpose even among rhetoric which seems on 
face to function like a social movement. 
The George W. Bush legacy.  A final implication concerns the body of research that 
studies Bush’s place within the rhetorical presidency.  This scholarship was discussed in chapter 
two and proceeds from the idea that Bush’s rhetoric was so partisan, ideological, and dishonest 
that it represented a paradigm shift in the way that the president addresses the American people.  
When pushing CIR, Bush tried to engage traditional strategies of reason and openness, only to be 
undone by the partisan forces he helped create. 
Clearly, the world of CIR was poisoned by hyper-partisanship, making the middle ground 
hard to find and impossible to defend, even as various polls consistently reported that the 
majority of Americans favored moderate approaches.  In order to explain how the hyper-
partisanship sank Bush’s version of CIR, many of the most vocal critics of Bush’s partisanship 
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and demagoguery work from the assumption that CIR was designed as a cynical ploy to lure in 
unsuspecting Latinos (Edwards & Herder, 2012; Hartnett & Mercieca, 2007; Mercieca & 
Vaughn, 2008). While Karl Rove’s vision of a durable Republican majority was certainly 
appealing to the party at the outset of the movement and employed as a way to garner support 
from moderates, there is little evidence to support the idea that Bush was exploiting the Hispanic 
population or operating from a sinister motive instead of pushing what he thought was an 
effective policy solution that recognized immigrants as human.  As discussed in chapter one, 
Bush demonstrated an unparalleled commitment to immigrant issues since his days as Governor 
and the frequency of his public appeals in support of Barack Obama’s CIR push relative to his 
silence on many other issues after leaving office is further evidence that Bush genuinely cared 
about the issue.  He repeatedly called his failure to achieve CIR his biggest disappointment, 
including during his Democratic successor’s battle with Congressional Republicans on a similar 
plan, which is hardly the behavior of a cynical Anglo politician hoping to dupe Latinos.   
The distinction between an exploitative Bush and a sincere one is more than a question of 
morality or an attempt to recast his legacy in a more positive light.  The sincerity of his desire 
explains the most important oversight in many of the previous studies undertaken on the topic, 
which is that if Bush simply wanted to bolster Republicans at the polls, he should have adjusted 
his message towards deportation and abandoned the temporary worker program.  It makes no 
sense for Bush to stake all of his remaining political capital on a battle with his own party unless 
doing so might achieve a policy about which he had strong personal convictions.   
 It’s possible that Bush attempted to return presidential rhetoric to rational ground and 
openness because he recognized that this issue was too important to fit into argument forms 
based on polarization and partisanship.  If so, it’s telling that the most influential architect of the 
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toxic political environment of the 21st century recognized the shortcomings of the argumentative 
environment he helped create.  It is also possible that he simply misread the audience, failed to 
predict the reaction of the far right, and lacked the political clout to fix his mistakes.  If that is the 
case, then the same architect of 21st century hyper-partisanship did not recognize what he had 
created.  In either case, the historical record of CIR and the Bush presidency should reflect a 
sincere politician who managed to provide the seeds of his own undoing when he betrayed the 
democratic principles on which the institution of the presidency was built.   
 On a simpler level, the findings of my research support the idea that it is difficult to move 
opinion when a speaker has limited power and entrenched constituents are angered.  The 
difficulty Bush encountered when trying to persuade his audience is illustrative of the world he 
created, but his failure should not be considered a damning indictment of his intentions.   
Conclusion 
 George W. Bush failed to achieve the public support necessary to pass “a good bill” 
(Bush, 2005, para. 38), in spite of broad approval of the general provisions of the bill.  He tried 
strategies based on definition, associations with the Border Patrol and the war in Iraq, simple 
security claims, calls for rationality based alternately on pragmatic political feasibility and the 
spiritual value of immigrant humanity, and finally he tried manipulative dichotomies between his 
policy and straw-person opposition.  None of the strategies translated to broad support on either 
the left or the right.  He was eventually defeated by vitriolic rhetoric from the right wing that 
used strategies of obstinacy and labelling.  Returning to the metaphor of the drama, perhaps F. 
Scott Fitzgerald’s comment is apropos:  “Show me a hero and I’ll write you a tragedy” 
(Bianculli, 2015).  As Bush worked to paint himself as a hero throughout the push for CIR, he 
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